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ABSTRACT 
South Africa offers an important model of how nations can make the transition to 
democracy. The experience of South Africa reflects its own unique history and political 
circumstances, which differ from those of other nations. Nevertheless, the history of the 
establishment of democratic civilian control in South Africa offers potentially valuable 
lessons for other nations to adapt and apply to their own challenges. 
This thesis examines and analyzes how civilian control over the South African 
National Defense Force was established, especially over the functions of defense 
budgeting and policy. It seeks to describe how the leadership of the Umkhonto we 
Sizwe: meaning the “Spear of the Nation” (MK - the military wing of the African 
National Congress), pursued those negotiations with their counter parts in the South 
Afiican Defense Force. I would argue that the military might of the apartheid regime, 
SADF, was still very powerful and the regime could have still exploited that power to 
overwhelm MK in the negotiations on the future of South Africa. The SADF also posed 
a major risk, as it possessed the potential to stage a coup in post-apartheid South Africa. 
To remedy this ostensible imbalance, ANC concluded that for the negotiations to be 
hi t ful  and successful, the political playing field had to be leveled. To do this, all parties 
participating in the negotiation needed to have equal status, especially the government 
and the ANC as the two major role-players. This, the ANC argued, would ensure that the 
I 
apartheid government was not a referee and a player at the same time. 
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South Africa offers an important model of how nations can successfhlly make the 
transition to democracy. The experience of South Africa reflects its own unique history 
and political circumstances, which differ fiom those of other nations. Nevertheless, the 
history of the establishment of democratic civilian control in South Africa offers 
potentially valuable lessons for other nations to adapt and apply to their own challenges. 
The following concepts are important to draw lessons from. A party negotiating with a 
powerful military like the SADF must have a well thought out strategy. An atmosphere 
conducive for negotiation must be created where all parties have an equal voice. To 
realize this objective, legal mechanisms like the adoption of the Interim Constitution in 
South M c a  can be instituted. Transitional political institutions like the Transitional 
Executive Council help in leveling the political playing fields. They are the ones 
empowered to oversee the negotiations and the whole transitional process. This 
guarantees some limitations on certain parties from abusing state power, by virtue of 
being the government of the day, in order to overwhelm their counterparts in negotiation. 
Military negotiations are very delicate and they should not be relegated to the 
realm of military negotiators only. There should be a political commitment and guidance 
to the process. The military officers negotiating should be agents for their political 
principals. Where the military fail to reach a consensus, the politicians should intervene. 
From the beginning of the negotiation, the chain of command must be clear, the 
politicians should be the bosses. A clear understanding of civil-military relations of both 
parties is an important factor because it gives a clear understanding of the arguments 
ix 
made. Failure to understand the mental fiame of the opposite side might lead to 
suspicions that are uncalled for, and this might lead to tensions that sabotage the whole 
process. Lastly, the institution of time lines for military negotiators, by the political 
leadership, creates a business or mission like approach. The negotiators are able to avoid 
overindulging in differences, because they want to fulfill their mission. Currently, the 
concept of civilian control over the military in South Africa is sacrosanct. The civilian 
Secretary of Defense is both the Head of the Department of Defense and the Accounting 
Officer. The South Afiican Constitution clearly stipulates the supremacy of the civilian 
authorities over the military. The good thing is that the institution has been established 
and found acceptable by the uniformed personnel. The civilians are beginning to master 
their functions within the military environment. On the other hand, there are still 
constraints to the system. The Defense Secretariat is still understaffed and the uniformed 
personnel are still carrying out some of the functions albeit they are reporting to the 
civilian component. There is a glaring lack of civilians with the necessary knowledge 
and skills of the defense function and most of those appointed tend to spend most of the 
time out of their ofices attending courses. This phenomenon creates an atmosphere 
where the uniformed personnel end up running the show and the threat is that they might 
usurp their power to try and reverse the gains already made. 
This thesis examines and analyzes how civilian control over the South African 
National Defense Force (SANDF) was established, especially over the unctions of 
defense budgeting and policy. It seeks to describe how the leadership of the Umkhonto 
we Sizwe: meaning the "Spear of the Nation" (MK - the military wing 
National Congress), pursued those negotiations with their counterparts 
X 
of the Afiican 
in the SADF. 
Furthermore, it explores the consequences for the current structures of civilian control 
over defense budgeting and policy in South Africa. 
xi 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The apartheid security forces posed a major threat to destabilize the democratic 
transition in South Africa. The military might of the apartheid regime, the South African 
Defense Force (SADF), was still very powerful and the regime could have still exploited 
that power to overwhelm their counterparts in negotiations on the future of South Africa. 
The apartheid military possessed the potential to stage a coup &&at in the case the anti- 
apartheid forces won the elections. 
This thesis examines and analyzes how civilian control over the South African 
National Defense Force (SANDF) was established, especially over the hc t ions  of 
defense budgeting and policy. It seeks to describe how the leadership of the Umkhonto 
we Sizwe: meaning the “Spear of the Nation” (MK - the military wing of the African 
National Congress), pursued those negotiations with their counterparts in the SADF. 
Furthemore, it explores the consequences of these negotiations for the current structures 
of civilian control over defense budgeting and policy in South Africa. 
The period prior to the negotiated settlement in 1994 was characterized by the 
failure of the Pretoria regime to rule in the same old way. The regime had reached a 
realization that the policy of apartheid did not have a future due to the changing world 
situation at the end of the cold war. On the other hand, due to the power the regime still 
held, the ANC was not in a position to deliver the kind of crushing blow, which would be 




According to Cheryl Carolus, a South Afiican Communist Party and ANC 
member, the country had arrived at a dual power situation where there were two chief 
contenders, the government led by the National Party and the ANC, and each had a broad 
range of supporters. These two key performers exclusively occupied different aspects of 
political power in South Africa. This made it “impossible for the government to 
implement its own policies; the ANC could effectively checkmate that. Both parties 
realized that they occupied strategic positions, they were very powerful, but also lacked 
key elements of being able to seize overall political power in the country. Because of 
this, they realized they had to enter into negotiations.”’ 
A similar view was raised by Joe Slovo2 in a seminal document on negotiations 
entitled, “Negotiations: A Strategic Perspective,” in which he states that 
The conjuncture of the balance of forces (which continue to reflect current 
reality) provided a classical scenario which placed the possibility of 
negotiation on the agenda.. . . We are negotiating with the regime because 
an objective balance of forces makes this a feasible political strategy.. . . 
The immediate outcome of the negotiating process will inevitably be less 
than perfect when measured against our long-term liberation objectives.. . . 
And we must not fear to be up front on this reality with our mass 
con~tituency.~ 
Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Afiica: The Elusive Social Contract, Princeton: Princeton 
Joe Slovo is the former Ghief of Staff of MK, a member of the National Executive Council of the 
Joe Slovo, Negotiations: A Stratepic PersDective, Paper Reprinted in Afiican Communist, Third 
University Press, 1995, p. 74. 
* 
ANC, and at the time the Chairman of the Sou+ Afiican Communist Party. 
Quarter, 1992, pp. 35-40. 
2 
This acceptability of further compromise in Slovo’s assessment centered around 
two major considerations: “the security forces and state bureaucracy constituted a 
counterrevolutionary threat.’+’ 
I argue that while this balance of forces existed, the military might of the 
apartheid regime, SADF, was still very powerful and the regime could have still used it to 
overwhelm MTC in the negotiation. SADF officers were more experienced in conventional 
military skills compared to MK, who mostly had experience as guerillas or 
unconventional soldiers. Undeniably, the regime hoped to use this apparent strength 
against the African National Congress (ANC) who enjoyed support and legitimacy fi-om 
the anti-apartheid forces. First, because of the comparative advantage that the SADF 
enjoyed over MK, the regime intended to exploit it negatively as a leverage to overwhelm 
their counterparts in the negotiation. Second, the SADF posed a major coup risk in case 
the ANC won the democratic elections in 1994.5 
To remedy this ostensible imbalance, ANC contended that for the negotiation to 
be fiuitful and successful, the political playing fields must be leveled. To do this, all 
parties participating in the negotiation should have equal status, especially the 
government and the ANC as the two major role-players. This, the ANC argued, would 
ensure that the apartheid govemment was not a referee and a player at the same time. 
When we started the process of negotiation, our political leadership played a profound 
Sisk,p. 221. 
Lekoa S. Mollo, From Personal Experiences as a Member of the Army Sub-workmouD that took Dart 
in the Negotiations for the Establishment of the New South African Army, Unpublished Paper: Pretoria, 
February - April, 1994. 
3 
role as principals to the process and they intervened when the military negotiators could 
not reach a consensus.6 
A turning point in the leveling of the political playing fields was when the 
negotiators adopted the Interim Constitution on 18 November 1993. The ANC had 
argued that the negotiations could not continue under the discriminatory laws of the 
apartheid Constitution. An Interim Constitution was necessary to give all parties equal 
standing before the law. This meant that the ANC leadership should, by law, have the 
same standing as their counterparts in the National Party, some of whom were cabinet 
members. For example, de Klerk as the President of South Africa, and Nelson Mandela 
as the President of the liberation movement (the ANC), had the same voice on issues 
pertaining to negotiation and transition. In the same breath, Joe Modise as the 
commander of MK, and Kobie Coetzee as the Minister of Defense were also equals. On 
the military level, the negotiators led by General Meiring then Chief of the SADF, and 
his counterpart Siphiwe Nyanda then Chief of Staff for MK also had the same voice. 
I argue that the Interim Constitution laid an important foundation for civilian 
control of the military because it clearly outlined the military subordination to the 
political authority. In principle, it committed the political actors to the concept of civilian 
control of the military even before the members of the different constituent forces could 
meet for their first round of talks in 1994.7 Article 227 (1) of the Interim Constitution, 




civilian control for example that, the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the 
NDF [Article 82(4)(a)]. 
The civil-military experiences of both the SADF and the MK were to have an 
immense influence on the military negotiators. Most of the generation of SADF 
negotiators had no experience in civilian control over the military. After 1966 the post of 
the civilian Secretary of Defense was done away with and the Chief of the SADF 
functioned as both the Accounting Officer' and the Head of the Departmentg of Defense. 
The SADF was henceforth established as the de facto and de jure Department of 
Defense. lo 
On the other hand, MK had emerged from a tradition where the military was 
subordinate to the political leadership. From the beginning, when Umkhonto we Sime 
was created on the 1 6th June 196 1 , its founding manifesto stated that it "fully supports the 
national liberation movement, and our members jointly and individually, place 
themselves under the overall political guidance of that movement". l 1  
* Chapter 1, Section 15 (3) of the Exchequer Act NO 66 of 1975 provides that any Department will have 
an accounting officer ". . . who shall be charged with the responsibility of accounting for all state moneys 
received (and) payments made by him" (1); that the accounting officer derives his powers from law, by 
regulation and Treasury Instructions (2); and (3); unless otherwise directed by the treasury, the accounting 
officer shall be the Head of the Department. 
The function of the Head of Department is defined by Section 7 of the Public Service Act of 1994. 
Schedule one of the Act stipulates that the Chief of the National Defense Force is the Head of the 
Department. However, section 7 does not prohibit the appointment of a functionary at the same level as the 
Head of the Department. 
lo Comarative Defense Ministrv Organizations - Department of Defense: Establishment of a Ministrv of 
Defense, (Lecture by Brig. Jack Grundling at Defense Management Institute, University of Witwatersrand, 
20 September 1994). 
Manifesto of Umkhonto we Sizwe, (Leaflet issued by the Command of Umkhonto we Sizwe, 16" 
December 1961). 
5 
The ANC, which was banned as a political organization in South Afiica in 1960, 
held its first Consultative Conference in Morogoro, Tanzania from 25 April to 1 May 
1969. In explaining the relationship between the military and the political, the 
conference stated that the revolutionary armed struggle meant a political struggle by 
means which include the use of military force even though once force as a tactic is 
introduced it has far-reaching consequences on every aspect of the activities. In light of 
this, the conference stated that it “is important to emphasize this because our movement 
must reject all manifestations of militarism which separates armed people’s struggle fiom 
its political context3,.l2 
Based on its manifesto, MK would therefore view any departure fiom the practice 
of having civil control over the military with suspicion. Such a move would be regarded 
as a ploy by the apartheid government to use the military to destabilize the new 
democratic order if the ANC won the elections. 
The subordination of the military to civilian control, at an early stage of the 
negotiation process, was an important tactic by the ANC that ensured that the SADF 
remained under check from the political authorities thus alleviating threats for a 
conspiracy to stage a coup against the new order. The fears of a coup conspiracy were 
proved to be true in 1998 when General Meiring, as the Chief of the South -can 
National Defense Force, submitted an intelligence to President Nelson Mandela 
’* Intensifk the Revolution, (The ‘Morogoro Conference,’ Morogoro, Tanzania, April 25-May 1 1969). 
l3 The Meiring Report was a military intelligence repoa handed to President Nelson Mandela on 5 
February of 1998 by General Meiring personally alleging that there was a left wing plot to topple him. 
Among others the report implicated Meiring’s successor General Nyanda with conspiracy against the 
government. When it was later found out that the report was a misinformation General Meiring was 
discharged fiom service. 
6 
alleging a coup plot orchestrated by former MK members, including Ronnie Kasrils and 
General Nyanda. This allegation was later proved to be a fabrication by the old apartheid 
guard who wanted to sabotage the new democratic order.I4 
The insistence by the ANC on the creation of the Transitional Executive Council 
(TEC), a body responsible to oversee the transitional process fi-om apartheid to a 
democratic dispensation, was another milestone in ensuring that the regime was not a 
referee and a player at the same time.15 The Council had seven subcouncils which "were 
empowered to peer into government decision making and operation ... It was under 
the auspices of the Transitional Executive Council that the Sub-council on Defense was 
established. The Sub-council on Defense was entrusted with the task of the general 
oversight of the security forces during the transition period. The Transitional Executive 
,916 
Council placed some time limitations on the process of negotiation. These time 
constraints compelled the military negotiators to fulfill their mandate within the 
stipulated times, and could they not afford to overindulge in trivial issues. If there was a 
disagreement over an issue, it was referred to principals of both sides and a political 
solution obtained. The chain of command was clear, the political leaders were the 
bosses. No doubt, this was the embryonic stage of civilian control. Also, considering the 
fact that the military negotiators were accountable to their political principals, this proved 
to be the nascent stages of civil-military relations for the post apartheid South Afiica." 
l4 
l5 Sisk, p. 230. 
l6 Sisk, p. 235. 
l7 Mollo, Personal Experiences. 
Mail and Guardian, Some Unfinished Business after Meiring, 9 April 1998. 
7 
The powers granted to the Sub-council on Defense of the Transitional Executive 
Council to oversee the security forces during the transitional phase, was key to the 
establishment of civilian control over the military for two reasons. First, it became a 
mechanism to keep the SADF under close watch during the transition period. The 
apartheid regime could not unilaterally employ the SADF without prior consultation with 
the Transitional Executive Council. In this way an anti-coup mechanism was established. 
Second, a legacy for institutionalized civilian control structures was established. These 
structures formed a nucleus for the political leadership to exercise control over the 
military, thus enabling them to monitor threatening patterns of a conspiracy to stage a 
coup d'ktat. 
On the contrary, many among the SADF members wanted the status quo to be 
maintained. General George Meiring, who represented the SADF in the Joint Military 
Coordinating Committee during the military negotiations," insisted that the new Minister 
of Defense would make the final decision about the establishment of the civilian 
secretariat after the democratic elections.'' 
Furthermore, during an interview, Ishmael2' contended that, because the new 
democratic government was going to be based on power-sharing (with emphasis on 
proportional representation), General Meiring strongly believed that the National Party 
The Joint Military Coordinating Committee was a military workgroup for the sub-council on Defense 
of the Transitional Executive Council. It was co-chaired by General George Meiring, representing the 
SADF and MK's Chief of Staff Mr. Siphiwe Nyanda - now General and Chief of the South Afiican 
National Defense force after Gen. Meiring took early retirement. 
Interview with Mr. Aboobaker Ishmael, former Chief Defense Policy in South Afiica. (Ishmael was a 
leading participant representing MK in the negotiations for the establishment of civilian control over the 
military in the new democratic South Africa). He participated in the negotiation process prior to and after 
the election. 
8 
(the ruling apartheid party) would retain the portfolio of Defense Minister. He hoped that 
Kobie Cotzee would retain his post as Defense Minister and thus the status quo would be 
maintained?’ The maintenance of the status quo would make General Mereing (who was 
appointed as the new Chief of the South African National Defense Force by President 
Nelson Mandela after the elections), both the head of the department and the accounting 
officer. In this way he would have immense power and the interests of the white minority 
would thus be safeguarded against the ANC govemment. 
In his endeavor to maintain the status quo, Vice Admiral P. van Zyl Leodolff, 
former Chief of Personnel, raised concerns about the establishment of civilian control. 
He stated that the establishment of the civilian Secretary of Defense as the accounting 
officer would negatively influence the responsibility of the Chief of SANDF with regard 
to his accountability including that of personnel management?2 The Admiral further 
pointed out that “by placing certain managerial functions outside the control of the CNDF 
may indicate that political hctionaries wish to directly control personnel matters in the 
(CNDF is Chief of National Defense Force, and NDF is National Defense 
Force). He further argued that the civilian section would lengthen the administrave 
process by adding another link in the chain of control resulting in the weakening of the 
personnel management process. “The personnel management and administrative 
my23 




van Zyl LeodolfE HSPN/518/3/12,2 May 1994. 
Feedback on the Proposals in respect of the Ministrv of Defense, Memorandum by Vice Admiral P. 
Ibid.,p. 6. 
9 
evolution. It cannot be replaced by new processes and structures overnight. The process 
and structures including the shifting of powers and functions must be brought in line with 
the process of the restructuring and rationalization of the NDF.1124 
The concerns raised by the Admiral pertained to the SADF's reluctance to 
institute change. Fierce negotiation lay ahead to resolve these problems; no one wanted 
to rock the boat. The political masters played a crucial role in giving direction to the 
establishment of new civil-military relations, which among many other milestones, 
resulted in civilian control over defense policy and budget functions. 
The establishment of civilian control was achieved through the appointment of a 
Ministry of Defense workgroup, comprised of academics and policy-making institutions. 
The workgroup made recommendations of a so-called 'balance model' which was 
approved by the Sub-Council on Defense of the Transitional Executive Council and later 
implemented as a model for civilian control. This model stipulated that the President and 
the Minister must handle political affairs, the Chief of SANDF, military affairs and the 
administrative chiefs, administrative affairs. For this purpose a Defense Secretary 
responsible for administration was required. The scope of the power of the Chief of 
SANDF was restricted to the military domain. By keeping the administrative divisions 
and the level of his power subordinate to the Minister, the Chief of SANDF involvement 
in political decisions was prevented. The Minister under the authority of the President 
balanced administrative and military interests. 
24 Ibid.,p.7. 
10 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE TOPIC 
The security forces posed a major destabilizing threat to South Africa during the 
negotiations and the post-elections period if the ANC became new government. The 
adoption of the Interim Constitution and the creation of Transitional Executive Council 
were an important milestone in leveling the political playing fields so that the military 
could be kept under constant check. These institutions helped in subordinating the 
military to the civilian authority thus minimizing the destabilizing threat that the SADF 
posed. Indeed, these institutions helped in avoiding a possible coup that the military 
could have staged and in this way a process of democratic consolidation commenced. 
The important lessons that can be drawn fiom the South African experience is that 
while a conjuncture of the balance of forces between the warring parties might exist, the 
negotiating parties must acknowledge their potential strengths and weaknesses. The 
ANC had to acknowledge that the MK soldiers had mostly a guerilla or unconventional 
experience, while their counterparts in the SADF had a comparative advantage in terms 
of conventional warfare. This necessitated a comprehensive strategy that would level the 
playing fields so that the MK could enter the negotiations as an equal to the SADF. 
Therefore, it behooves a party negotiating with a powerful military like the SADF to have 
a well thought out strategy. An atmosphere conducive for negotiation must be created 
where all parties have an equal voice. To realize this objective, legal mechanisms like 
the adoption of the Interim Constitution in South Afiica can be instituted. Transitional 
political institutions like the Transitional Executive Council help in leveling the political 
playing fields. They are the ones empowered to oversee the negotiations and the whole 
transitional process and they lay a good structural foundation for civilian control. This 
11 
guarantees some limitations on certain parties from abusing state power, by virtue of 
being the government of the day, in order to overwhelm their counterparts in negotiation. 
Military negotiations are very delicate and they should not be relegated to the 
realm of military negotiators only. There should be a political commitment and guidance 
to the process. The military officers negotiating should be agents for their political 
principals. Where the military fail to reach a consensus, the politicians should intervene. 
From the beginning of the negotiation, the chain of command must be clear, the 
politicians should be the bosses. 
A clear understanding of civil-military relations of both parties is an important 
factor because it gives a clear understanding of the arguments made. Failure to 
understand the mental fiame of the opposite side might lead to suspicions that are 
uncalled for, and this might lead to tensions that sabotage the whole process. 
Lastly, the institution of time lines for military negotiators, by the political 
leadership, creates a business or mission like approach. The negotiators are able to avoid 
overindulging in differences, because they want to fulfill their mission. 
Currently, the concept of civilian control over the military in South Afiica is 
sacrosanct. The civilian Secretary of Defense is both the Head of the Department of 
Defense and the Accounting Officer. The South Afiican Constitution clearly stipulates 
the supremacy of the civilian authorities over the military. The good thing is that the 
institution has been established and found acceptable by the uniformed personnel. The 
civilians are beginning to master their functions within the military environment. 
On the other hand, there are still constraints to the system. The Defense 
Secretariat is still understaffed and the uniformed personnel are still carrying out some of 
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the functions albeit they are reporting to the civilian component. There is a glaring lack 
af civilians with the necessary knowledge and skills of the defense function and most of 
those appointed tend to spent most of the time out of their offices attending courses. This 
phenomenon creates an atmosphere where the uniformed personnel end up running the 
show and the threat is that they might usurp their power to try and reverse the gains 
already made. 
One can question the importance of this particular case. Why South Afiica? The 
belligerents in the South Afiican conflict emerged from a deeply divided society and 
managed to establish a democratic order with sound civil-military relations. The country 
offers an important model of how nations can make the transition to democracy. The 
experience of South Africa reflects its own unique history and political circumstances, 
which differ from those of other nations. Nevertheless, the history of the establishment 
of democratic civilian control in South Africa offers potentially valuable lessons for other 
nations to adapt and apply to their own challenges. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on information obtained from formerly classified documents 
which recorded the process of establishing civilian control over the military prior to the 
first democratic elections and the post election period in South Africa. Interviews with 
some of the participants who played a profound role during these negotiations, and my 
personal experiences as a member of the Army sub-workgroup that was part of the 
negotiating team for the creation of the South African National Defense Force will be 
used to supplement this information. 
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Chapter I1 of this thesis will examine the evolution of civil-military relations in 
both MK and the SADF and how these challenges influenced the negotiators. Chapter 111 
describes the setting of the negotiation stage and the transitional challenges faced by the 
new South Afiica. It will also take the imperatives imposed by the Interim Constitution 
into account. Chapter IV will look into the process of negotiation prior to democratic 
elections. Chapter V considers the process of negotiations after the elections. Chapter VI 
will conclude by offering some lessons learned. 
14 
11. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BOTH THE MK 
AND THE SADF 
This chapter will examine the evolution of civil-military relations in both the MIS 
and the SADF and how these challenges influenced the negotiators. Indeed, there can be 
no doubt that negotiators from both camps had different agendas. Obviously, their 
experiences were different. On the one hand, SADF officers wanted to maintain the 
status qu0.2~ Most of them had no experience of civilian supremacy over the military. 
They had emerged from a background where the Chief of the SADF was both the head of 
the department and the accounting officer. The SADF was de facto and de jure 
Department of Defense?6 On the other hand, MK officers had emerged from a tradition 
where the military is subordinated to the political authority. This was their experience 
and they were not prepared to allow the contrary to happen.27 These divergent views had 
to be taken into consideration before a consensus could be reached. 
A. THE IMPACT OF SADF’S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING 
THE NEGOTIATIONS 
Although most of the SADF officers were opposed to civilian control over the 
military and regarded it as a foreign concept, there were a very small number of them 
who had served under a civilian Secretary of Defense during the fifties and sixties. 
It is important to note that after the Anglo-Boer war, when the Union of South 
Afiica was established and Union Defense Force created under Britain, the concept of 
Mollo, Personal Experiences. 
Lecture by Brig. Jack Gmdling. 26 
27 Mollo, Personal Experiences. 
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civilian control over the military was introduced. The Under-Secretary for Defense was 
appointed and he was described in the Defense Act and the Permanent Force regulations 
as the “Permanent Head of the Department.”28 He had control over functions pertaining 
to finance, expenditure, government policy regarding the administration of the Defense 
Act and regulations, orders and instructions issued by the Minister. Later this post was 
upgraded to Secretary of Defense?’ 
It was not until 1966 that the Verster Commission (appointed to reorganize the 
DoD), recommended that the post of the Defense Secretary be done away with, and the 
Chief of the SADF be the head and accounting officer of the department. This 
established the SADF as the de facto and de jure Department of Defense.30 
The Commission further recommended that the Minister of Defense be removed 
fiom the military chain of command, although he was still responsible for the formulation 
of defense policy?1 These memories were to serve as benchmarks for most of the 
generation in the SADF. Even though most of the these officers had not worked under 
civilian authority, they argued that the system could not work because of historical I 
experiences. They made insinuations that the proposed concept of establishing civilian 
control over the military would fail like old the secretariat in the SADF had failed.32 
The arguments made for the absorption of the Defense Secretary into the SADF 
were; first, that there was a lack of suitably qualified personnel to advise the Minister and 
Lecture by Brig. Jack Grundling. 28 
29 Ibid,p. 2. 
30 %id, p. 3. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Mollo, Personal Exueriences. 
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Service Chiefs on political and economic policies. Second, the civilian secretaries were 
not able to understand the nature of modem war and the needs of the armed forces, 
especially as evidenced after the world advanced into a different environment in the post 
1939 era. Third, there was a wasteful duplication in administration by using the civilian 
secretariat as the channel of communication for the defense force with other state 
 department^.^^ 
These arguments are understandable if one appreciates the fact that those who 
were making them wanted the maintenance of the status quo. They had hoped that the 
MK would succumb to these sentiments especially because SADF officers had 
‘experience’ in maintaining a conventional force. The realities of modem democracies 
show that civilians are capable of understanding and running the defense organizations. 
Civilians can be empowered through training programs so that they do their work 
properly, and dealing with financial or policy issues does not require any military 
training. In many democracies where there is civilian control over the military, the art of 
modem warfare has been executed effectively, e.g. U.S. and the U.K. The function of 
liaising with other state can be well carried out by the civilian authorities. To avoid 
duplication, both the military and civilians should have their functions streamlined. 
The process of absorbing the secretariat into the SADF left the Minister of 
Defense as a national leader with limited capacity to manage the affairs of the 
de~artrnent.3~ This state of affairs made the Chief of SADF very powerful. It required 
him to deal directly with the President; thus making him vulnerable to being involved in 
33 Lecture by Brig. Jack Grundling. 
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politics. In this organizational structure, military professionalism is likely to be 
compromised. Instead of serving the democratic government as a military professional, 
he was in a position to manipulate the system to get what he wanted. Huntington links 
“civilian control to the minimization of military power, which would allow civilian 
authorities effectively to make the military ‘the tool of the Defense 
management in a democracy requires civilidpolitical control of the military. 
B. THE IMPACT OF MK’S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Those of us fi-om the MK saw the challenges of the new situation differently. We 
had been brought up in a tradition where the military was subordinated to the political 
leadership. In emphasizing the supremacy of politics over the military, the ANC referred 
to the period of the formation of MK and clearly stated that ‘‘from the very beginning our 
Movement has brooked no ambiguity concerning this. The primacy of the political 
leadership is unchallenged and supreme and all revolutionary formations and levels 
(whether armed or not) are subordinate to this leadership. To say this is not just to invoke 
tradition. This approach is rooted in the very nature of this type of revolutionary struggle 
and is borne out by the experience of the overwhelming majority of revolutionary 
movements which have engaged in such  struggle^".^^ As MK, we were weary of an 
approach that gave the military absolute power. Our experience had taught us that the 
34 Ibid. 
35 
Cambridge, MA: B e h p  Press, 1957, p. 84. 
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political supremacy gives the military a proper direction. The organizational structure of 
the ANC and MK reflected this relation~hip.~~ 
The supreme political organ of the ANC is the National Executive Council (NEC) 
headed by the President. During the Morogoro Conference in 1969, the ANC established 
a Revolutionary Council (RC) which was entrusted with the task of developing 
underground structures, creating publicity for the banned ANC, and waging the armed 
struggle, in South Afiica. Oliver Tambo, as the president of the ANC, was the chairman 
1 of the Council. Council members included political leaders such as Joe Modise (the 
commander of MK) who was responsible for military  operation^.^^ This structure 
ensured that the political leadership made military policy. They were the ones who gave 
us orders and defined the enemy in South Afiica as the apartheid system and not the 
Afiikaners . 39 
Politico-Military Council (PMC) replaced the Revolutionary Council in 1979. It 
became the executive arm of the National Executive Committee of the ANC and dealt 
with matters pertaining to the conduct of the political and military struggle inside South 
Afiica. The Politico-Military Council coordinated the activities of the Political 
Headquarters, the Military Headquarters, and the National Intelligence (NAT). It had a 
small secretariat to support its functions. The council met once a month to assess the 
overall strategic planning for internal ANC/MK work, and the state of the nation. Its 
37 Mollo, Personal Exoeriences. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Mollo, Personal Exoeriences. 
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secretariat met between full council meetings on a weekly basis?’ The new structure 
further indicated the ANC’s resolve that the military should be under the political 
leadership. 
In a 1985 document outlining Umkhonto we Sizwe’s Military Code, the ANC 
further clarified the relationship between the political and military struggle. The 
document stipulated that the MIS was the fighting arm of the ANC and its allies. The 
code stated that “our armed struggle is a continuation of our political struggle by means 
that include armed force. The political leadership has primacy over the military. Our 
military line derives from our political line. Every commander, commissar, instructor, 
and combatant must therefore be clearly acquainted with the policy with regard to all- 
combat tasks and missions. All of us must know clearly who the enemy is, and for what 
we are fighting. Thus MK cadres are not only military units, they are also organizers of 
our people. That is the major distinction between our people’s revolutionary army and 
the army and wholly militarized authoritarian amied forces of the racist, imperialists and 
reactionary regimes. Umkhonto cadres, with arms in hand, are political activists and 
leaders, as well as warriors. This combination of political and military functions is 
characteristic of all popular, revolutionary armies especially in the phase of guerrilla 
warfi~e.~”’ 
Afiican National Congress Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 1996. 
Umkhonto we Siswe Militarv Code, (ANC Second National Consultative Conference, held in Kabwe, 
40 
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Zambia), 16 - 22 June 1985. 
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Ronnie Ka~ri1.s~~ gave a clear picture when he stated in a discussion document 
that, since the formation of the MK “our positions on armed struggle have amounted to: 
‘Umkhonto we Sizwe is the instrument of the ANC and of our liberation movement, and 
takes its leadership, direction and command fiom the ANC. Political policy and strategy 
determines our military strategy; politics guides the gun.77743 
From the statement above, it is clear that at the policy level, the MK was 
subordinated to the political leadership, which was comprised mostly of civilians. 
Therefore the MK did not only want to implement the concept of civilian control because 
it is practiced by modem democracies; it was the system they had known. 
The finances of the ANC were handled by the Treasurer General, who then 
allocated funds to the MK’s Chief of Logistics and Ordinance. The Chief of Logistics 
and Ordinance then allocated funds to various sections of the MK according to their 
requirements. Later, when the functions of logistics and ordinance were separated, the 
Chief of Logistics became responsible for MK funds, which were still being allocated by 
the Treasurer General of the ANC4 
C. CHALLENGES 
Agtiero contends that “civilian supremacy is reached through a process consisting, 
first, of the removal of the military fiom power positions outside the defense area and, 
second, of the appointment and acknowledgement of civilian political superiors in the 
42 Ronnie Kasrils is the former Deputy-Minister of Defense in South Africa. Presently he is the Minister 
of Water Affairs. He is one of the founding members of MK and was the Chief of Military Intelligence for 
MK, a member of the National Executive Council of the ANC, and a member of the South African 
Communist Party. 
43 
44 Interview with Ishmael. 
Ronnie Kasrils, The Revolutionarv Armv: A Discussion Article, Sechaba, September 1988. 
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defense and military areas. As the military withdraws fiom non-defense-related policy 
areas, civilian officials gain authoritative capacity in all policy areas, including 
defense.'*' 
Taking this statement into account, the challenge that faced the negotiators in 
South Afiica was to level the political playing fields. The National Party was the 
government of the day, albeit it was voted and maintained by a minority in power. The 
ANC had to elevate itself to the level of the regime so they could negotiate as equals. It 
also had to overcome the might of the SADF by making MK negotiators equal to their 
counterparts. Such a process entailed prolonged strategies geared towards creating a 
clear chain of command where the politicians could be in charge of the negotiation 
process!6 
Once the structures were in place, the ANC had to confront the resistance to 
civilian control over the military by SADF officers. Some of these officers genuinely 
believed that the introduction of the civilian secretariat would impact negatively on the 
managerial functions of the defense force!' They argued that the secretariat would be an 
additional link that would prolong, complicate, and duplicate the personnel management 
and administrative functions. Such processes, they contended, evolved over a long 
period of time and could not be changed overnight!8 A strong argument posed was that 
the aim of introducing civilian control was "to limit the use of military power for 
Felipe Agiiero, Soldiers, Civilians. and Democracy: Post-Franc0 Suain in Comarative Persvective, 
Mollo, Personal Experiences. 
45 
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unconstitutional purposes.” However, in so doing “it is not advisable to limit the 
administrative effectiveness of the NDF.’A9 It was further argued by the SADF that by 
taking away the accounting function fi-om the Chief of the South African National 
Defense Force would impact negatively on his accounting responsibilities and that of 
personnel management.50 
The importance of the process of negotiating for the establishment of harmonious 
civil-military relation is well captured in the following words. “Democratization of civil- 
military relations needs to rely on processes of bargaining, dialogue, cooperation, and 
consensus-building that generally diminish military prerogatives and redefine and 
professionalize the military’s mission through a series of incremental steps.”51 If not 
much attention is paid to the process of negotiation, the outcome might result in a discord 
between those in uniform and civilians. 
These were some of the challenges that confronted the makers of modem South 
Afiica. The experience of the old apartheid officers was also very valuable because most 
of the MK officers had unconventional experiences. There was a need to strike a balance 
between alleviating the fears of the SADF officers and the imperatives of civilian control 
dictated to by a democratic dispensation. 
Even though the ANC won the democratic elections in South Africa, there were 
pockets of resistance among some of the old SADF members who felt threatened by the 




positions. They saw the new dispensation as a threat to their jobs that had once been 
protected. Some had genuine reservations about civilians with no military backgrounds 
working within the defense environment. Their concerns were that these civilians would 
be empowered to make decision on policy matters that would involve the life and well 
being of soldiers, an experience they do not have nor could they comprehend. On the 
other hand, the ANC could not afford to antagonize their counterparts. Understandably, 
there was fear that the security forces posed a counterrevolutionary force for the new 
democratic order?2 It took immense persuasion to convince skeptics that civilian control 
is healthy for democracy. The mechanisms employed by the negotiators to broker 
solutions in establishing sound civil-military relations were very important, especially in 
deeply divided societies, because all participating parties needed to begin to feel that they 
were part of the outcome. No party could suspect the others were imposing their will on 
them because of the political leverage they enjoyed. If such suspicions arose, conflict 
would be inevitable. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Arguably, both sides had baggage. On the one hand most of the generation of 
SADF negotiators had not experienced civil control. However, the fact that the practice 
could be traced in the history of the SADF made negotiators receptive to the idea of civil 
control. They could not see this as a deceptive ploy by MK. It is clear that there were 
those who genuinely believed that the concept would not work. On the other hand, the 
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experience of MK leaders has always been that of political supremacy of the military. 
Any departure from this practice would have been viewed as a ploy by the National Party 
government to use the military against the new democratic order. They were not going to 
resolve this problem without referring it to the political authorities. 
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111. SETTING THE STAGE FOR NEGOTIATIONS 
The security forces and the state bureaucracy constituted a counterrevolutionary 
threat to the democratization of South Africa. The SADF had the potential to derail the 
negotiation process by destabilizing the country. On the other hand, they posed a major 
threat of staging a coup against a democratically elected government in case the National 
Party lost the elections. The state was likely to use the state resources such as 
broadcasting and finances to overwhelm the anti-apartheid forces during the negotiations 
and the democratic elections. Therefore, it was important for the ANC that mechanisms 
that could keep these security forces and state bureaucrats under check be established. 
The process of political negotiations for a democratic transition in South Afiica 
was preceded by numerous meetings among stakeholders, some secret and others public, 
in an endeavor to reach a consensus for a post-apartheid country. One such meeting was 
held in Cape Town on 10 - 12 February 1993 between the apartheid government and the 
ANC. Some of the milestones reached in this meeting were:53 
1. The enactment of an Interim Constitution and provisional bill of rights that 
would be drafted by a reconstituted multiparty conference (this act was to be passed by 
the apartheid Tricameral Parliament). 
2. A Transitional Executive Council (comprised of a multiparty cabinet 
committee), would oversee the government during the election campaign and would 
exercise multiparty control over broadcasting, finance, and the security forces. 
53 Sisk, pp. 223-224. 
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The Interim Constitution laid the foundation for the creation of a new order in 
South Africa. The apartheid constitutional laws were set aside, making way for the 
transition to democracy to be governed by rules acceptable to the role-players. The 
agreement to adopt an Interim Constitution was an important milestone because it laid the 
basis for the leveling of the political playing fields. This step clearly indicated that the 
ordinary laws of the country, as promulgated by the apartheid government, would not 
interfere or hamper the process of negotiation, as the new laws would apply. The 
government would become an equal player before the law with other stakeholders in the 
negotiation process. 
On the other hand, the creation of the Transitional Executive Council with its 
multiparty cabinet committee laid a concrete foundation in making the process legitimate 
because it would oversee the government during transition. Hence the government could 
not become a referee and a player at the same time. The power to exercise multiparty 
control over the broadcasting, finance, and the security forces was an important step in 
the leveling process. The government could not have monopoly over these state assets in 
order to use them for its own ends. It was important to keep the security forces under 
close observation, as they possessed the means of force to sabotage the negotiations. The 
same can be said about broadcasting. If the apartheid government enjoyed the monopoly 
of this machinery, it could use it effectively in disseminating propaganda that could 
discredit other role-players in the negotiation. Control of the finances was very important 
because resources play a crucial role during transition. Had the government enjoyed the 
monopoly of controlling the purse, then it would have been able to use the immense 
resources at its disposal against the opposition who had unmatched capabilities. 
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A. THE KEY ACTORS 
The Transitional Executive Council was the supreme body that was created by the 
political role-players to level the political playing fields. All participating parties were 
represented. This was the body to oversee the transitional process. The rationale behind 
the creation of this body was to give everyone equal status. The apartheid government 
had to enjoy equal standing with other stakeholders. As stated earlier, it was not 
supposed to be the referee and player at the same time. Under the Transitional Executive 
Council, the Sub-council on Defense was created to deal with security matters. ?'his 
body also enjoyed equal representation among stakeholders. 
The members of the Sub-council on Defense were politicians who had to oversee 
the process of establishing the South African National Defense Force, and above all the 
Ministry of Defense. Under the Sub-council on Defense, a Joint Military Coordinating 
Committee was established which was comprised of the military chiefs of the constituent 
forces taking part in the strategic planning process for the integration and creation of the 
new defense force. The Joint Military Coordinating Committee was co-ohaired by 
General G.L. Meiring (Chief of the SADF) and Mr. S .  Nyanda (Chief of Staff of MK - 
now a General). Under the Joint Military Coordinating Committee, various sub- 
workgroups were formed, and they dealt with the various debates that had to be ironed 
out for integration to be successful. These workgroups reported to the Joint Military 
Coordinating Committee, and the latter reported to the Sub-council on Defense, who 
then reported to the Transitional Executive Council. One such sub-workgroup created by 
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the Joint Military Coordinating Committee was the Ministry of Defense sub- 
workgroup. 54 
B. TRANSITIONAL CHALLENGES 
During the early ‘90s there was an increase in the level of violence especially 
against the political opponents of the government. The ANC, concerned with the 
escalating violence within the black communities, alleged that there was a ‘‘third force7755 
that was orchestrating the escalating violence. In July 1991 , through a number of security 
leaks, evidence emerged that members of the Five-Reconnaissance Regiment of the 
SADF Special Forces (known as “the Sth Recces”) had taken part in numerous, 
indiscriminate black township massacres. The evidence pointed out that SADF military 
intelligence were “orchestrating” the so-called “black on black” violence in the townships 
“with the Special Forces doing the killings.”56 
The ANC knew the role the SADF played in trying to sabotage the democratic 
transition in neighboring Namibia.57 A former SADF consultant, Nico Basson, and Sue 
Dobson, an ANC “mole” who had infiltrated the SADF’s public affairs unit, both having 
served in Namibia, claimed that the Directorate of Military Intelligence of the SADF, 
including some of the South African security forces, conducted a concerted campaign of 
54 Mollo, Personal Experiences. 
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“dirty tricks” operations against the Namibian liberation movement during the c o ~ t r y ’ s  
constituent elections?’ 
The July 1991 security leaks revealed ongoing secret funding by the apartheid 
regime of de Klerk of the Zulu Inkatha movement and its affiliate, the United Workers 
Union who opposed the ANC. In what became known as the “Inkathagate” slush fund 
scandal, six government special accounts for secret funding and covert operations were 
exposed.59 
The immense public outcry concerning the escalating violence, and the 
Inkathagate scandal, resulted in the government and opposition parties agreeing on a 
National Peace Accord in September 1991. It was under this accord that the de Klerk 
government established a judicial commission of inquiry under Justice Richard Goldstone 
to investigate the political violence.60 This commission found evidence of the “Third 
Force” which was composed of serving and former security force members and contract 
operatives who were responsible for the political violence.61 With all these events, the 
ANC could not trust the good faith of the govemment commitment to negotiation. 
Hence, it insisted on the creation of a body that would have the institutional capacity to 
oversee the transition. Overwhelmed by the evidence against it, the government had to 
submit. 
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The first report of the technical committee of the Transitional Executive Council 
was put before the Negotiating Council for debate on 13 May 1993. In these talks, the 
implicit agreement between government and the ANC was that the security forces would 
not be subjected to direct multiparty operational control in the run-up to the elections. 
This has been a long-standing demand by the ANC. It agreed however, that the Sub- 
Council of the Transitional Executive Council would exercise general oversight.62 
The reluctance to grant operational control of the security forces to the 
Transitional Executive Council was indicative of the regime’s sinister motives toward the 
process. It can be argued the motive was to have the armed forces held in reserve as a 
tool of last resort in case the negotiations were to emerge in favor of the ANC. However, 
the fact that both the ANC and the regime compromised their positions and conceded that 
the Transitional Executive Council would only exercise a general oversight function was 
a major milestone. I contend that these were the nascent stages of civil-military relations, 
because the civilian political authority had the power to oversee the military. 
It was agreed that the legislation enabling the Transitional Executive Council and 
the independent electoral commission had to be in place in time to organize the elections 
by 27 April 1994. This legislation had to be passed by the Tricameral Parliament in a 
special sitting scheduled for September 1993. It was in light of this that the Multiparty 
Negotiating Process, after seventeen drafts, finalized the details of the Transitional 
Executive Council, the creation of the independent electoral commission, and the media 
62 Sisk, p. 230. 
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and broadcasting legislation on 8 September 1993.63 Each of the nineteen parties and 
organizations in the Multiparty Negotiating Process that agreed to the Transitional 
Executive Council would have one representative, and provision was made for those who 
I 
were not part of the process to be able to join. The Transitional Executive Council had 
seven subcouncils who were “empowered to peer into government decision making and 
operation; in effect, the changes signaled nascent, institutionalized power sharing in 
South Afiica’s transition as opposed to the less formal influence the ANC had on 
government policy since the onset of t ran~i t ion.’~~ 
Indeed, the conditions necessary for the leveling of the political playing fields 
were being achieved. The fact the door was left open for stragglers to join the process 
made the process more credible and legitimate. The provision allowing each party and 
organization one member each was a giant step in leveling the playing fields. No party 
was to feel overwhelmed by numbers, and all had an equal say. This process was very 
important as it laid the foundation for the composition and representation of later teams 
that would undertake military  negotiation^.^^ 
It was after midnight on the 18th of November 1993, that the Negotiating Council 
of the Multiparty Negotiating Process approved the Interim Constitution and the Electoral 
Act, 1993. The chairman of the negotiating forum, Judge Mohamed, summarized this 
occasion in the following words: “The dawn has finally begun to break for a nation which 
63 Ibid,p. 235. 
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I has for so long so painhlly and tortuously wrestled with its own soul. No force can now 
I stop or even delay our emancipation from the pain and shame of our racist past.”66 
This Constitution unequivocally stated the “need to create a new order” and the 
establishment of “a single National Defense Force.”67 The Sub-council of Defense of the 
Transitional Executive Council was entrusted with the task of creating this force by 
overseeing the integration of various armed forces. It was composed of political leaders 
representing the different role-players. To fulfill its task, the Sub-council created a 
workgroup, the Joint Military Coordinating Committee. This workgroup was comprised 
of military leaders and it was co-chaired by SADF and MK. The Joint Military 
Coordinating Committee formed a number of sub-workgroups which dealt with various 
issues that had to be resolved before a new integrated defense force could be formed (e.g. 
Army sub-workgroup, Personnel sub-workgroup, Navy sub-workgroup etc.). Like the 
Joint Military Coordinating Committee, the sub-workgroups were comprised of the 
members of forces participating in the negotiations.68 
From the beginning, it was clear that the military negotiators were subordinated to 
the political authorities. Politicians were principals and the military negotiators were just 
agents. The latter could only make recommendations, which had to be approved by their 
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C. THE IMPACT OF THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 
The interim constitution provided the legal and constitutional basis for the 
SANDF and the framework for civil-military relations under the Transitional 
Government of National Unity. Article 227 (1) of the Interim Constitution, 1993 defines 
the functions of the National Defense Force, and includes provisions on civilian control, 
such as, the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the NDF [Article 82(4)(a)]. 
The Constitution established a Joint Standing Committee on Defense in 
Parliament, which consist of members of all political parties with more than ten seats in 
the National Assembly and were willing to parti~ipate.~~ This committee was 
empowered to investigate and make recommendations on the budget, functioning, 
organization, armaments, policy, morale, and state of preparedness of the defense force. 
They also perform other hc t ions  related to parliamentary supervision of the force as 
was prescribed by law.70 
Because of the imperatives for Parliamentary control over the armed forces as 
derived from the Interim Constitution, the Joint Military Coordinating Committee’s 
strategic planning process identified the development of civilian control and the related 
structure of the Ministry of Defense as a strategic issue. This issue concerned the 
Department of Defense structure that was outside the Joint Military Coordinating 
Committee strategic planning brief. This question was thus referred to the Sub-Council 
of Defense of the Transitional Executive Council for its attenti~n.~’ 
69 
70 Ibid., Article 228 (3)(d). 
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The Joint Military Coordinating Committee also requested the Sub-council of 
Defense approval for the invitation of academics and policymaking institutions to give 
input regarding the structure of the new Ministry of Defense. The resolution of the 
civilian control and Ministry of Defense structure was essential for the finalization of the 
SANDF implementation planning.72 
The third Joint Military Coordinating Committee meeting held on 11 February 
1994 reported that the Sub-Council of Defense had approved the request to invite 
academics and policymaking institutions to give input. The Joint Military Coordinating 
Committee invited various institutions to submit suggestions regarding these issues. A 
three-stage process to integrate the proposals (papers delivered) from the invited actors 
was suggested and facilitated by SADF Directorate Strategic Management. In light of 
this, a Ministry of Defense Workgroup was established, and it was comprised of civilian 
and defense experts.73 
The approval for the invitation of these ‘experts’ granted credibility and 
legitimacy to the spirit of the negotiations. Indeed, it leveled the playing fields because 
the input by these civilian and defense experts was to be seen as non-partisan. The 
workgroup was able to make comparative studies of other ministries of defense in 
democratic countries and made recommendations for South Africa. This process was 
another milestone in providing a consensus for the establishment of a civilian secretariat 
in the Department of Defense. 
i 
72 bid.  
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D. PRINCIPLES 
When the Ministry of Defense workgroup started its work, it explored the concept 
of civilian control in terms of four principles, namely: the separation of military and 
civilian powers; legality; accountability; and trans~arency.~~ The following were the 
formulations expounded by the workgro~p :~~  
1. Separation of Dowers: The essence of this division was that armed forces 
should refrain fiom involvement in politics. This was to ensure that the military 
participated in the development of defense policy without undermining or usurping the 
authority of civilian decision-makers, whilst civilian authority refrained from interference 
with the military chain of command. 
2. Legality: Law determines the powers and functions of the armed forces. 
The military is expected to uphold the Constitution. 
3. Accountabilitv: The public and parliament require an assurance that the 
military is performing its duties according to democratically agreed policy decisions. 
The Minister and the government are themselves answerable to parliament and the public 
for defense spending and for the formulation and execution of defense policy. 
4. TransDarency: Accountability requires a sufficient degree of transparency 
with regard to defense matters. 
These principles became the terms of reference that the workgroup based its work 




the workgroup, and this was to serve as a major breakthrough in the establishment of a 
civilian secretariat in the Department of Defense. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The creation of the Transitional Executive Council with its multiparty cabinet 
committee, and its institutional capacity to exercise multiparty control over the 
broadcasting, finance, and the security forces was an important step in leveling the 
political playing fields. The govemment was not to have monopoly over state assets 
which it could use for its own ends and the demand by the ANC that government could 
not be a referee and a player at the same time was met. 
It was important that the security forces be kept under close watch; this way the 
negotiations were able to proceed in good spirit. The control of the broadcasting function 
by the Transitional Executive Council was also v e v  important as it ensured the apartheid 
government could not enjoy a monopoly over this machinery. This also contributed to 
the leveling of the political playing fields, because both the ANC and the government had 
access to use the South African Broadcasting Cooperation. Another milestone was the 
control of the finances because the government was denied the opportunity of controlling 
the purse. 
The adoption of the Interim Constitution signaled that the ordinary laws of the 
country, as promulgated by the apartheid government, would not interfere or hamper the 
process of negotiations, since the new laws would take precedence. The govemment and 
its counterparts would become equal players before the law during the negotiation 
process. 
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The invitation of academics and policymaking institutions, when creating the 
Ministry of Defense workgroup, made the process more credible and legitimate because 
they were seen as non-partisan members. The role these civilian and defense experts 
played was a critical part of the process. 
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IV. NEGOTIATION PRIOR TO DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 
multiparty officers and various civilian research institutes. It studied civilian and 
political control of the military in established democracies and made proposals for the 
I establishment of a Ministry of Defense. 
The research was done inductively on three levels of abstraction, first 
The Ministry of Defense sub-workgroup was appointed to study the impact of the 
Interim Constitution on defense management. The sub-workgroup did this study for the 
Sub-council on Defense of the Transitional Executive Council. It was formed by 
Defense structure. This proposal was termed the ‘balance model’ and was accepted by 
the Sub-council on Defense on 6 May 1994, after the first democratic elections.76 
I 
The creation of the Ministry of Defense workgroup to pursue the study for the 
establishment of civilian control over the military was another milestone in the leveling 
process. The workgroup became a forum where participants in the negotiations discussed 
issues as equals. Due to the fact that it was comprised of multiparty officers and various 
I 
civilian research institutes, the workgroup enjoyed legitimacy as no one was seen to be a 
referee and a player at the same time. Because of this legitimacy, its recommendations of 
a balanced model between the civilian and military functionaries were acceptable to the 
negotiators without pointing fingers of bias towards the ANC or the apartheid regime. 
The balanced model recommended by the workgroup made a clear separation of defense 
’15 Post Election Civilian Control and Ministrv of Defense Structure, JMCC/DSM/501/6,20 April 1994. 
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and military functions. Furthermore, it recommended that there must be a collaborative 
relationship between the civilians and the military because some of the functions under 
the civilians required military collaboration and vice versa. In this way the workgroup 
was able to chart a way forward for the establishment of harmonious civil-military 
relations. 
This chapter focuses on the work of the Ministry of Defense workgroup during 
the negotiations prior to democratic elections. When the workgroup started its work, it 
initially focused on the impact of the Interim Constitution on defense management. It 
made a study of civilian and political control of the military in democracies and then 
made proposals for the establishment of a Ministry of Defense for the Department of 
Defense.77 
The workgroup conceded that the Interim Constitution provided a legal basis for 
the establishment of the SANDF, because it defined the functions of the SANDF and the 
nature of civilian control over the military. Furthermore, it stipulated that the SANDF 
should perform its functions and exercise its powers in accordance with the Constitution, 
under the directions of government and under the supervision of Parliament.78 
The workgroup acknowledged that all countries take steps to control their armed 
forces. However, in a democracy, the governing concept is civilian control over the 
armed forces. In other words, the military is subordinate and accountable to the elected 
and duly appointed civilian authority. In principle, the concept of civilian control was a 
77 Ibid. 
78 Post Election Civilian Control and Ministrv of Defense Structure, JMCC/DSW501/6,20 April 1994. 
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constitutional imperative that left no choice for the negotiators. They had to comply 
because the rule of law is one of the tenets of democracy. 
While the work of the Ministry of Defense workgroup continued, the major focus 
in the country was the coming democratic elections scheduled for 21” April 1994. It was 
upon General Meiring’s insistence that the Joint Military Coordinating Committee 
decided that the new structure of both the Department of Defense and the Ministry of 
Defense would be completed under the direction of the new Minister of Defense that was 
to be appointed by the new President. The general hoped that the National Party would 
retain the portfolio of defense and that the proposed civilian structure will make no 
substantial changes to the status quo. He believed that Kobie Cotzee would retain his 
position as Minister of Defense in the Government of National Unity because he was a 
key actor in the negotiations for democratic t ran~i t ion .~~ It was after the elections that 
major progress was made towards establishing structures for civilian control over the 
military. 
The Ministry of Defense workgroup became a catalyst during the negotiations 
because it was seen as a group of specialists and professionals who were ‘impartial’ and 
honestly interested in resolving issues of civil-military relations in a democracy. It, 
therefore, created a climate conducive for the negotiations to be fruitful; thus avoiding 
debates that may have created hostilities and tensions fiom self-interested actors in the 
form of military negotiators. Some of these tensions could have threatened the process of 
’’ Interview with Ishmael. 
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transition. The crucial mission was the establishment of the military in a democracy. 
This argument won the day." 
Another focus of the workgroup's study was on the design of the Ministry of 
Defense. This design had to be new one because it was going to operate under a new 
dispensation of transition from authoritarian to democracy. The old apartheid design was 
out of question since it was meant to serve a militaristic state. A comparative 
methodology was used to study the design for the new ministry. However, the 
workgroup pointed out that theie are limits in terms of what can be learned from other 
countries in making this new design, because civil-military relations and ministries of 
defense evolve over decades and are deeply rooted in the political culture and 
constitutional history of each new country. Furthermore, the workgroup stated that 
fonnal arrangements described in legislation and organizational charts do not reflect the 
modus operandi as applied in practice through informal relationships between the 
military and civilians." Nonetheless, four broad guidelines from the experience of 
democratic countries were drawn:'* 
1. A distinction was made between the formulation and the execution of 
defense policy. As a general rule, civilians are responsible for the former and the military 
is responsible for the latter. 
2. Military officers do participate in the development of policy but they do so 
under the formal direction of the civilian authority. 
Mollo, Personal ExDeriences. 
Post Election Civilian Control and Ministrv of Defense Structure, JMCC/DSM/501/6,20 April 1994. 
82 Ibid. 
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3. Civilians are always responsible for the political dimensions of defense 
policy. 
4. 
The workgroup established the following criteria in deciding whether a particular 
The military voluntarily accepts its subordination to the civilian authority. 
defense function should be civilian or military responsibility in South Africa:83 
1. 
2. 
3. Commonsense. After an in-depth study, the workgroup referred to 
defense experts fi-om other countries and argued that this was all-important and would 
apply differently from function to function. The key question was: “Does the function 
logically fall under civilians or under defense  headquarter^?"^^ 
A. 
The principles and values of the Constitution. 
The broad guidelines referred to above. 
DESIGNING THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
The new design for the Ministry of Defense became a major debate among the 
negotiators. The Joint Military Coordinating Committee determined that the SANDF’s 
strategy, size (with temporal increase because of the integration of different forces), and 
technology would not change significantly but that changes in the institutional 
environment and political control had to be planned for. The institutional environment 
was changing fi-om an authoritarian to a democratic political system whilst political 
control entailed the development of civilian control by post-election defense  controller^.^^ 




These factors necessitated changes to the structure of the Department of Defense and its 
ministry. 
This approach was an acknowledgement by the military negotiators, especially 
the SADF officers, that the democratic dispensation would mean that they adapted to the 
new environment. Changing from authoritarian rule to democracy entailed new civil- 
military relations. It became clear that civilian control over the military was inevitable, 
and no alternative options were available. 
The following key organizational components relating to the structure of the 
Department of Defense and its ministry were determined by the workgroup:86 
1. Defense management culture. The Interim Constitution set an institutional 
environment requiring the development of civilian control respecting the associated 
separation of powers, legality, accountability, and transparency principles. 
2. Post-election Defense Controllers. After the democratic elections, the new 
defense controllers (State President, Defense Minister, and Chief of the SANDF) would 
emerge and this would give rise to the reporting relationship prescribed by the Interim 
Constitution. 
3. Defense management process. The post-election defense management 
process had to conform to the above-mentioned principles and process of state 
administration. 
An analysis of the Department of Defense and its ministry’s structural options had 
to take these components into account since they are interactive. Optional civil-military 
Ministrv of Defense Design, Appendix C to JMCC 501/6, April 1994. 86 
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relations between post-election defense controllers and normative defense management 
process were debated and analyzed as follows:s7 
1. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 
The relationship between the following key civil and military defense controllers 
is fundamental to Department of Defense and its ministry’s structural considerations: 
1. State President as Commander-in-Chief 
2. Defense Minister 
3. 
4. 
Chief South Afkican National Defense Force 
Defense Secretary (as found in most western democracies). 
The workgroup came up with the following patterns in these relationships: 
vertical, coordinated, and balanced.” 
The vertical pattern, which also reflected the status quo, has the following 
 characteristic^:^^ 
Note: In these debates the concept “command” is seen as collectively 
representing the functions of planning, ordering, and controlling. 
1. The Chief of SANDF is subordinate to the Minister and has no 
constitutional channel to the President except in case of a national defense state.” 
2. The Chief of SANDF has control over all the activities of the department 
under the Minister. 
87 IbicI,p. C-2. 
88 Ibid,p. (2-4. 
89 Ibid. 
The state of national defense refers to a state of national emergency. 
47 
3. Because the Chief of SANDF supervises the administrative and service 
chiefs, the possibility exists that the Minister could be reduced to a nominal leader. 
. 4. This pattern did not conform to the separation of powers principle because 
Chief of SANDF has political and administrative responsibilities as well as executing the 
function of military command. 
5.  This pattern did not fulfill the requirements of civilian control, thus it was 
not to be perpetuated nor provided for in the final constitution. This suggested that to 
conform to civilian control requirements, a Defense Secretary should be instituted. 
The vertical pattern model could not be accepted because it sought to maintain the 
status quo. The model fails to take into account the constitutional imperatives for civilian 
control. 
The balanced pattern has the following  characteristic^:^^ 
1. It gives the President a purely political function, that is, decisions 
regarding the highest policy issues as well as supervision over the military establishment. 
The Minister is subordinate to the President and fulfills a purely political 2. 
function and is accountable for the overall military organization. 
3. Under the Minister, on the same hierarchical level, is a military and 
administrative component. 
4. The Chief of SANDF is the military advisor to the Minister and also 
commands the military forces. The Chief of SANDF is subordinate to the Minister who 
Ministrv of Defense Desim, Appendix C to JMCC 50116, April 1994, p. C-4. 
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is in tum subordinate to the President. The President and the Minister do not exercise 
military command. Such command is restricted to the level of the Chief of SANDF. 
5. The Secretary is the civilian advisor to the Minister and also manages the 
administrative divisions that execute non-military functions such as finance, 
procurement, etc. 
6. The President and the Minister handle political affairs, the Chief of 
SANDF, military affairs and the administrative chiefs, administrative affairs. For this 
purpose a Defense Secretary responsible for administration is required. The scope of the 
power of the Chief of SANDF is restricted to the military domain. By keeping the 
administrative divisions and the level of his power subordinate to the Minister, the Chief 
of SANDF involvement in political decisions is prevented. The Minister under the 
authority of the President balances administrative and military interests. 
7. This pattern is the most conducive to civilian control and military 
professionalism. Civilian and military functions are clearly separated and the latter 
remains subordinate to the former. 
The balanced pattern of civil-military relations was to form the foundations of the 
Department of Defense and the its ministry design proposal, because it recognized the 
concept of civilian control over the military. The balanced model creates harmony in 
civil-military relations because civilian and military functions are clearly separated. 
The coordinated pattern has the following  characteristic^:'^ 
Note: This pattern is constitutionally applied only in a state of national defense. 
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1. The military and administrative functions are separated immediately under 
I the President. 
2. The Minister is restricted to non-military administrative functions whilst 
the Chief of SANDF executes his military functions directly under the President. 
3. The administrative line is fiom the President to the Minister to the 
administrative chiefs whilst the command line runs fiom the President through the Chief. 
of SANDF to the military forces as provided by the Interim Constitution for a state of 
national defense. 
4. This pattern does not satisfy the requirements of civilian control. 
Although the Chief of SANDF is restricted to military functions alone, he may become 
involved with political issues due to the direct constitutional channel that he has to the 
President. The President may be too pre-occupied with other issues to give attention to 
the interaction between political and military policy therefore the Chief of SANDF is 
required to make political decisions. The President, by virtue, of the short command 
channel between himself and the Chief of SANDF, can be tempted to become directly 
involved in military affairs and command without the necessary competency. 
This pattern is constitutional during a state of national defense but is 
unconstitutional in peacetime. 
The balanced pattern of civil-military relations with a Defense Secretary for 
defense administration was thus established as the constitutionally required and 
strategically appropriate pattern because it fulfilled the requirements for healthy relations 
between the military and civilians by clearly separating their functions. Under this model, 
the functions of policy and finance are allocated to the civilian section of the defense. 
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B. DEFENSE SECRETARYKHIEF OF SANDF RELATIONSHIP 
Having established that the balanced pattern of civil-military relations should be 
the foundation for the Department of Defense and its ministry, the power relationship 
between the Defense Secretary and the Chief of SANDF was then analyzed to derive an 
appropriate designg3 
The administrative component under the Defense Secretary should release Chief 
of SANDF fiom detailed involvement in administrative and policy matters of a political 
nature. To this end the administrative component was to consist predominantly of 
civilian civil servants. This component was used to further civilian control within the 
Department of Defense by the allocation of specific functions such as defense policy and 
finance. Three basic relationships using the parameters decision making level and extent 
of functions were identified?4 
1. Subiective Relationship. In this relationship, decision-making powers are 
removed fiom the military component and allocated to the civilian component thus 
excluding the military fiom higher decision levels. The workgroup argued that this 
relationship does not take into account military professionalism and is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
2. Obiective Relationship. The control of functions is distributed between 
civilian and military components, thus recognizing the role of military professionalism. 
However, the relationship presupposes that functions may be clearly divided which is 
93 Ibid, p. C-6. 
94 bid. 
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often not the case. 
marginalization will likely occur. 
The relationship has the further implication that functional 
3. Collaboration Relationship. In this relationship, the distribution of 
functions between civilian and military components recognizes the exclusivity of certain 
functions, that is, either military or civilian or vice versa. It also recognizes that certain 
functions resorting under the civilian component require military collaboration. 
The collaboration relationship is the most appropriate to further civilian control 
within the Department of Defense and its ministry whilst recognizing military 
professionalism and should apply to the normative Department of Defense and its 
ministry design. 
C. BROAD DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSENINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
DESIGN 
The study thus far established that the balanced civil-military relationship pattern 
was the most appropriate for the SANDF and it was within this context that the 
collaborative relationship for the Defense Secretary and Chief of SANDF was the most 
appropriate. 
This was because while the balanced model clearly separates functions between 
the military and civilians, a collaborative relationship acknowledges that some of the 
fimctions need a collaboration of both the military and civilians. 
Application of these choices resulted in the following broad design:95 
The Department of Defense consists of the office of the Defense Minister, the 
Ministry of Defense and the A r m s  of Service. The Ministry of Defense, in turn, consists 
95 Ibid,p. C-8. 
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of the physically and organizationally co-located Defense Secretariat and SANDF 
Headquarters. The Secretary heads the Defense Secretariat whilst the SANDF is headed 
by the Chief of SANDF. The SANDF consists of the SANDF Headquarters and the four 
Arms of Service (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Heath and Medical Services). 
The Ministry of Defense is the central organization for the strategic management 
of the SANDF focusing on policy and control. The ultimate raison d’etre of the Ministry 
of Defense is ensuring operational effectiveness in carrying out military operations by the 
SANDF. 
The roles of the Ministry of Defense are as follows:96 
1. Department of State through which the elected government issues 
instructions to the military. 
2. 
3. 
The Ministry of Defense formulates national defense policy. 
The operational requirements of the armed forces are made known through 
the Ministry of Defense. 
4. The headquarters through which government policy and decisions are 




The Ministry of Defense plans the defense program and budget over the 
The administrative headquarters organizing human resources, logistics, 
and procurement requirements of the service. 
The roles of the Defense Secretary are as follows:97 
96 Ibid, p. C-9. 
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1. Principal advisor to the Minister regarding policy matters. The Defense 
Secretary is a source of advice and an independent counsel to the Minister and military 
colleagues whilst at the same time providing a civilian balance to military issues. 
2. He is responsible for defense administrative duties including financial 
responsibilities by virtue of his appointment as the departmental accounting officer. As 
such he is responsible for: 
a. All expenditures of the Department of Defense fiom 
preparation of estimates through placing contracts to final accounting and 
audit. 
b. Organizing and carrying out business with other state 
departments and Parliament. 
c. Management of the civilian staff. 
Chief of SANDF has the following respon~ibilities:~~ 
1. Command the SANDF. 
2. Tendering military advice on strategy (military implications of defense 
policy), overall priorities in resource allocation, programs, current commitments, and 
operations. 
3. The planning, direction, and control of all military operations including 
relevant operational directives. 
4. Directing the work of defense staffs. 
97 Ibid, p. C10. 
* bid. 
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The Chiefs of the A r m s  of Service have responsibility for the administration, 
support, and training of their forces. 
The Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense is obliged to conform to 
the processes of state administration. The fundamental administration process is the 
annual planning, programming, budgeting, and control cycle. The following broad 
process related to the proposed Ministry of Defense design:” 
1. The appropriate secretariat staff is to formulate defense policy in 
collaboration with defense staff. The policy should include the envisaged defense ends 
and the limits within which the appropriate ways may be sought. 
2. Joint military staff determines defense doctrine and strategies for the 
guidance of the services. Resource policies are translated into directives for action by the 
services. 
3. The services determine appropriate doctrine and strategy and refer their 
military needs to the joint staff. 
4. Joint military staff prioritize these needs and propose plans, programs, and 
budgets for the appropriate secretariat function. 
5. The appropriate secretariat hnction assembles the defense policy, plans, 
programs, and budgets for the Minister in collaboration with military staff. 
6.  
7. 
Performance control takes place by feedback and audit. 
Although the Ministry of Defense functions at policy and control level, for 
economic reasons, certain centralized services may be provided. 
99 Ibid, p. C-11. 
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The locus of control for the formulation of key defense decisions may be derived 
fiom this broad process. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
The Ministry of Defense workgroup was a good mechanism for avoiding tensions 
that could have developed among the military negotiators. It avoided what could be 
referred to as the ‘us’ and ‘them’ syndrome; meaning ‘us’ as MK and ‘them’ SADF or 
vice versa. This could have created bad faith among negotiators and a solution for 
establishing civilian control over the military could not have been speedily obtained. 
Therefore it was a good mechanism to level the political playing fields. 
The workgroup also enjoyed legitimacy because most of its participants were seen 
as ‘outsiders’ who were not going to be part of the future Ministry of Defense structure 
and therefore they were not self-interested actors who had something to loose or gain. 
No one was seen as a referee and a player at the same time. 
Since the workgroup was mostly comprised of academics and researchers, it 
became seen as a more professional group. They were more credible because as 
specialists in defense related studies they could make more informed decision on how to 
conduct the military function in a democracy. This gave the military negotiators a chance 
to focus on more military issues like the threat analysis, force structure, force design etc. 
The clear separation of defense and military fimctions recommended by the 
workgroup in the balanced model created a firm base for designing the new Ministry of 
Defense. Uncertainties as to who would do what in the new structure were removed. 
However, the recommended collaboration relationship between civilians and the military 
components was another milestone because while it accepted the exclusivity of certain 
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functions, it recognized that some of the functions under the civilian component require 
military collaboration and vice versa. This way harmony will be created in terms of civil- 
military relations. 
By recommending peacetime and wartime civil-military relations the workgroup 
acknowledged the role of the military in decision-making. In peacetime the civilian 
authorities are responsible for policy and financial issues and the Minister of Defense is 
accountable for the overall military organization. However, in wartime, the military and 
administrative hc t ions  are separated immediately under the President. The Minister of 
Defense is restricted to non-military administrative functions, and the Chief of SANDF 
executes his military functions under the President. This then acknowledges the 
importance of the military’s role in decision-making during the state of national defense. 
The fact that the workgroup did its work for the Sub-council of Defense of the 
Transitional Executive Council removed the problem from the military realm into a 
political one. Once again this became a good measure for leveling the political playing 
fields. 
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V. NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 
The Ministry of Defense workgroup made its recommendations of a ‘balance 
model’, which were approved by the Sub-council on Defense of the Transitional 
Executive Council. The final stage of the Joint Military Coordinating Council strategic 
planning process (the implementation planning) was initiated on 13 February and 
concluded on 22 April 1994. The democratic elections followed on 27 April 1994 and 
the ANC became the majority party in the Government of National Unity. Nelson 
Mandela, who became the first democratically elected President of South Africa, 
appointed the former commander of MK, Joe Modise as the new Defense Minister.’” I 
The appointment of the ANC member as the Minister of Defense directly 
impacted the process of establishing civilian control over the military. Henceforth, all 
recommendations had to be approved by the minister. This gave the ANC a political 
leverage to pursue its goals amidst those who wanted to maintain the status quo. The 
process helped in leveling the playing fields because the military leadership was mostly 
in the hands of the former SADF. 
i 
I 
In his planning directive, the new Minister of Defense, Joe Modise, ordered the 
implementation of a structure suitable to effect civilian control over the military on 20 
May 1994. To this end, the proposals advanced by the Ministry of Defense workgroup 




loo Mollo, Personal Emeriences. 
lo’ P l k n g  Directive: Ministrv of Defense, Draft by General G.L. Meiring Chief of the SANDF, May 
1994, p. 1. 
This chapter will consider the transferring of the accounting function fi-om the 
Chief of the South Afiican National Defense Force to the civilian Secretary of Defense, 
and the approval of the 'balance model' by the Cabinet. It will also consider 
implementation strategies of transferring the policy and finance functions. Lastly it 
considers the strategic management team entrusted with the task of making procedures, 
and manning or staffing strategies for the Defense Secretariat. 
The implementation of the Ministry of Defense was executed as a project with 
certain objectives to be achieved within specified periods of time. A steering committee 
comprised of General Meiring, as the Chief of the SANDF and the new Secretary of 
Defense who by then still had to be appointed, was constituted. The steering committee 
was mandated to approve implementation plans and to direct the execution of approved 
plans.'02 The composition of the steering committee by both the Chief of the SANDF 
and the Secretary of Defense gave a balance of views fkom the military and the civilian 
perspectives thus leveling the playing fields. 
Additionally, a project team comprising two former SADF officers (Brigadier J.L. 
Grundling and Brigadier H.A. du Plessis) and two former MK officers (Mr. A Ishmael 
and Mr. R. Saloojee) was created. The mandate of the project team was to plan the 
structural transformation and to coordinate implementation. The project team was 
empowered to co-opt or employ functional experts as required. The major task of the 
project team was the transfer of the Departmental Accounting Officer function to the 
Defense Secretary and General Meiring contended that this should take place when 
'02 %id, p. 2. 
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feasible, but preferably at the start of the 1995/96 financial year. The planning process 
also had to include the necessary transfer of responsibilities and authority including the 
related legal amendments necessary to effect the legality of this objective.Io3 The channel 
of reporting was from the project team to the steering committee, who then reported to 
the Minister of Defense.lW The composition of the project team was another milestone in 
leveling the playing fields because it represented the two major role players. The 
reporting channel to the Minister of Defense indicated the importance of civilian 
supremacy, because only the political leadership could make final rulings on issues of 
policy. 
Cabinet had to consider approval for the acceptance of the ‘balance model’ 
approach in order to structure civil-military relations in the Republic of South Africa. In 
their discussions, the Cabinet acknowledged that the organization of the Department of 
Defense where the Chief of the South African National Defense Force acted as both the 
Head of Department and the Accounting Officer was not a common occurrence in 
Western democracies. The Cabinet concurred that the proposal of the ‘balance model’ 
for the Ministry of Defense as was found in many Western democracies should be 
implemented, where the Defense Secretary is encumbered with the policy and fiscal- 
administrative functions of the department. They acknowledged that this would result in 




Minister, Deputy Minister, Defense Secretary, and the Chief of the South African 
National Defense Force in the Ministry of Defense and the Arms of Service.'os 
The Cabinet approved of the restructuring Department of Defense and the 
Ministry of Defense according to the requirements of the 'balance model.' The Joint 
Portfolio Standing Committee on Defense and the Public Service Commission were 
consulted and formally briefed. Other departments consulted were, the Office of the 
Public Service Commission, the Office of the State Expenditure, and the Office of the 
Auditor General.lo6 The consultative process of approving the 'balance model' bears 
testimony to the importance of accountability and civil-military relations in democratic 
societies. The elected public officials must be consulted so that they can approve or 
disapprove military policies. 
Initially, the Chief of the South African National Defense Force was to remain the 
Departmental Head while the Defense Secretary would be the Accounting Officer of the 
department as was provided by section 15 of the Exchequer Act of 1975.'07 However, 
this state of affairs was to be corrected later and the Defense Secretary became both the 
Head of the Department and the Accounting Officer. lo' 
A. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IMPLEMENTATION 
The new Secretariat of Defense was established through a deliberately phased 
transitional process. General G.L. Meiring argued that it was impossible to establish a 
~ ~~ ~~ ~~ 
lo5 Cabinet Memorandum, Daartment of Defense: Civil-Militaw Relations. Establishment of a Ministry 
of Defense, February 1995. 
'06 Ibid. 
lo' Ibid. 
Mollo, Personal ExDenences. 
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fully-fledged Ministry of Defense with all its desired functions immediately upon the new 
minister taking office. The decision was therefore, to prioritize those functions which 
should be established in the Ministry as a matter of urgency."' 
By this time, there was acknowledgement, even by General Meiring, that civilian 
control over the military was inevitable. When I asked the Chief of the South African 
Navy, Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson, of his feeling about the establishment of civilian 
control over the military, he said he welcomed the idea. This was because in Western 
democracies there were established patterns of civilian control over the military, so South 
(t 
Africa had no choice but to follow suite. The Admiral further intimated that most of the 
Chiefs of the old SADF were fi-om the army, which made the Chief of the Army the most 
powerful person. The establishment of the Defense Secretariat was seen from the Navy 
side as a means to having equal standing with the Army as an arm of Service."O Such 
feelings as expressed by the Admiral were pivotal in creating a conducive climate for the 
establishment of civilian control over the military. The dissenting voices were gradually 
silenced by the popular support for the new idea. 
Some of the most important and urgent responsibilities identified for the Secretary 
in establishing in the new Ministry, were the policy and finance functions. In terms of 
policy, the Secretary would be responsible for defense policy in general and specific 
policy on such matters as legislative reform, internal deployment, foreign relations, and 
arms trade. Close liaison with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was required on certain of 
'09 
Administration, DMS/503/1/12, p. 12. 
'lo 
Postgraduate School, 24 May 2000. 
Post Election Parliamentarv Control and Ministrv of Defense Structure; Commission for 
Interview with Chief of the South African Naw, Vice-Admiral Simpson-Anderson, Naval 
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these issues. The responsibility of finances entailed all financial accounts of the 
Secretariat and the Defense Force, allocating funds according to the existing defense 
budget and for drawing up the new defense budget."' 
A strategic management team was appointed to formulate detailed plans, with 
clear objectives and time fiames, and to establish the above functions. The team 
consulted with the relevant functional experts within the Defense Force and also based 
change management strategies through an attitudinal survey. The main functions to be 
addressed were; l2 
1. 
2. Staffing 
3. Process designhedesign and integration 
4. Cultural change 
Ministry of Defense design and structure 
When the management team considered procedures that should be followed, the 
following two main requirements became evident:'13 
1. The establishment of an interim set of posts within the Ministry of 
Defense which would facilitate the transition of functions. It was felt that the incumbents 
appointed to these posts were to form the nucleus of the Secretariat. However, in due 
course the posts were to be absorbed in the final structures. 
2. The ability to approve the final structures for each functional area 
formally. This was submitted in functional parts over a period of time. 
~ ~~ 
Post Election Parliamentary Control and Ministrv of Defense Structure; Commission for 
Administration, DMS/503/1/12, p. 12. 
'I2 Ibid. 
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B. MANNING POLICY FOR DEFENSE SECRETARIAT: FINANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTIONS 
The essential element in the creation of the ‘balance model’ within the 
Department of Defense was the acceptance of Accounting Officership by the Defense 
Secretary. However, acceptance of the responsibilities attached to the appointment as 
Accounting Officer could not be taken lightly as accountability forms the comer stone 
around which the trust of the electorate and taxpayer is built, with special emphasis on 
the entrustment of public funds. Consequently any official accepting this responsibility 
has the right to insist on adequate resources to meet his responsibilities. In the case of an 
official who is promoted to Departmental Head and Accounting Officer, he takes over the 
entire departmental structure and can thus meet his responsibilities with the same 
resources as his predecessor. The appointment of the Defense Secretary as the 
Accounting Officer, while the Chief of the South African National Defense Force still 
retained the appointment of Head of Department, required special attention.’ l4 
The splitting of the accounting and the Head of Department function was a 
compromise reached in the gradual process of establishing civilian supremacy. This 
compromise created a climate of less resistance and the civilians would not be seen as a 
threat that was going to take all the power fi-om the military. 
The resources available to an Accounting Officer vary greatly in extent and 
These resources can, however, be sophistication from department to department. 
Ibid. 
Manning Policv for Defense Secretariat: Finance and Accountability Functions. Concept Only, by 
Brigadier E.R. Eden (Director Financial Administration), Appendix A-10, IG SANDF/SOl/l/l/MOD, 
February 1995. 
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categorized into two very broad categories. The first grouping consists, among other 
things, of all the organizational structures, systems and facilities to execute the day to day 
tasks. The second grouping is the actual personnel required to execute the tasks. 
Although the extent, impact and conditions of the first category can be readily determined 
and defined without suitably trained personnel in sufficient numbers, the task cannot be 
satisfactorily executed.' l5 
The preparations for the tasks to be effected by the Defense Secretary progressed 
and the Department of State Expenditure was approached for formal approval and for the 
issue of the required Treasury Orders. These Treasury Orders had to clearly define the 
role, function, duties, and responsibilities and specifically, accountability of each party 
(the Defense Secretary and Chief of the South African National Defense Force).'16 
However, this approval was not only dependent on the quality and applicability of 
the recommended segregation of duties and responsibilities, but also on the capacity of 
available personnel to satisfactorily meet these demands. It was thus essential that an 
adequate number of suitably trained personnel be made available to the Defense 
Secretary and that a detailed plan be made to maintain and retain an acceptable level of 
expertise and professionalism. A firm commitment to the full implementation and 
maintenance of the plan was req~ired."~ 
' 
The most important stage was the determination of those critical criteria which 
had to be met so as to ensure that an adequately trained and staffed workforce would be 
Ibid,p. I. 
'I6 Bid. 
'I7 Bid, p. 2. 
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available to the Defense Secretary to allow him to meet his responsibilities as the 
Accounting Officer. 
Brigadier E.R. Eden, the Director of Financial Administration argued that in order 
for the proposed Secretariat to operate effectively and for the Defense Secretary to “be 
able to meet his responsibilities as Accounting Officer, certain personnel related criteria 
or specifications had to be met satisfactorily, and be specified.” He stated the following 
criteria had to be met:”’ 
1. The level and quality of work provided by the finance functionaries at the 
time, satisfied the Accounting Officer responsibilities and if their services were made 
available to the Defense Secretary as the new Accounting Officer, his demands would 
also be satisfied. 
2. The requirement for greater transparency and civilian control emphasized 
the need for a general migration from a purely military structure to a more balanced 
model where there would be a larger percentage of civilian staff members, but that the 
value of the inputs and expertise of military tiained finance functionaries would 
guarantee their participation in a balanced work force. 
3. Although the move to establish civilian control was recognized, it could 
not be at the expense of the finance function itself. The standards were not be lowered 
and the finance and assets entrusted to the Department of Defense and specifically the 
Defense Secretary were not be placed at risk purely to satisfy the drive to establish 
civilian control. 
‘I8 Ibid,p. 8. 
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4. A very high level of trust and credibility had to be established between the 
Armed Forces and Defense Secretary’s personnel because the Secretariat concept 
required the military to subject themselves to the control of the Defense Secretary. 
C. MANNING SOLUTION 
Brigadier E.R. Eden argued that the following solutions be rejected for the finance 
hc t ion .  First, what he called a “full civilian solution.” He contended that because there 
was no pool of adequately trained civilian personnel within either the private or public 
sector this must be rejected. If not, the Defense Secretary would fail to meet his 
responsibilities as the Accounting Officer because of a lack of suitable labor force that 
could be assembled to fill all the critical posts.’ l9 
I find it hard to be convinced by the argument that there was no pool of 
adequately trained civilian personnel in either the public and private sector. Be it as it 
may, suffice it to say, that as Director Financial Administration (formally SADF), 
Brigadier E.R. Eden should have felt threatened by the fact that the civilians were going 
to take over the finance function. Therefore, it was in his self-interest that he argued that 
there were no adequately trained civilian personnel to protect the interests of the military. 
Second, he rejected what he called a “pure military solution.” His argument was 
that a pure military solution pre-supposes that the Defense Secretary would then also be a 
military man and consequently the entire finance operation would be under direct military 
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control. A model of this nature would not meet any of the democratic criteria of 
parliamentary and civilian control, transparency, credibility, legitimacy etc.I2O 
This argument is defensible because the issue of establishing a Defense 
Secretariat was no longer being debated as it had already been approved by the Cabinet, 
and the Minister of Defense had already given a ministerial directive for its 
implementation. 
In making his proposition, Brigadier E.R. Eden conceded that a move fi-om a pure 
military workforce towards a civilian organization was required. However, he stated that 
a pure civilian solution was unattainable and the only available solution was a mixture of 
personnel categories. The categories he recommended were;I2' 
1.  The representation of the military in those posts which require the 
viewpoint and military expertise and are essentials for a well-balanced product being 
delivered. These posts were to be largely limited to strategy and policy development. 
2. Transferring the uniformed members employed in finance functions to the 
Secretariat. These were posts representing a large portion of the daily responsibilities and 
tasks which were being carried out. The incumbents would have been trained as soldiers 
and in the execution of the finance function. 
3. Transferring the civilian members employed in finance functions to the 
Secretariat. These were members representing a large portion of the routine finance 
function. In most cases they did not take part in decision-making and therefore do not 
require insights into military matters. 
I2O bid.  
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4. The appointments of new civilian employees because most posts within 
the Secretariat would be new ones. These posts plus the vacant and other ones where 
incumbents did not wish to be transferred to the Secretariat, would be advertised and 
filled by new appointments fiom other State Departments and the civilian labor market. 
The Brigadier warned of a reasonably high level of risk that would be involved in these 
appointments because the personnel would not be trained for these specific posts, and 
would lack insight into the military way of doing things. They would however, be 
expected to develop the job content. These appointments would have to be very 
selectively made and risks contained to acceptable limits. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR STAFFING THE DEFENSE SECRETARIAT 
In order to establish a hctioning Defense Secretariat, there were some 
implications relating to staffing that had to be considered. First, it was going to be 
essential to employ the highest possible percentage of current incumbents in those tasks 
which were to be transferred to the Secretariat.'22 This was important in alleviating the 
fears of job losses by the old finance functionaries. The Interim Constitution made 
provision to protect civil servants currently employed.'23 Second, the selection of new 
appointees was limited to those positions and posts where other Defense Secretary 
personnel and suitable training institutions could speedily train them. 124 
12' bid. 
bid,p. 10. 
The South African Interim Constitution of 1993. 
l t4  Manning Policv for Defense Secretariat: Finance and Accountability Functions. Concept Only, by 
Brigadier E.R. Eden (Director Financial Administration), Appendix A-10, IG SANDF/5Ol/l/l/MOD, 
February 1995, p. 10. 
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On the other hand, it was important that those who were identified for possible 
employment within the Secretariat be given the opportunity to exercise their choices of 
whether they wanted to join or not. The reasons for being allowed to exercise these 
choices were: 125 
1. Those persons who were able to associate themselves with the Defense 
Secretary concept of control over the military were to be employed within the Secretariat. 
Normally, when a military person is transferred to a unit or Staff Division 
he remains under the control of his Arm of Service Chief. However, being transferred to 
2. 
the Secretariat meant that the Arm of Service Chief had to relinquish all claims and 
responsibilities to the transferred member. Therefore, any member, and especially any 
military finance functionary, who was not going to be able to swear loyalty and 
allegiance to the Defense secretary, was not to be forced or coerced in any way, to move 
to the Secretariat. 
Another important decision that was made was based on accepting the premise 
that the Secretariat would primarily become a civilian organization. A provision was 
made for uniformed personnel who were transferred to the Secretariat to be gradually 
replaced by civilians. During the implementation phase these military personnel would 
be transferred back to their respective A r m s  of Service, after a period of duty with the 
Secretariat. It was thus necessary to define the circumstances under which such return- 
transfers should take place.*26 
125 IbicI, p. 11. 
Ibid. 
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The option to return could not, however, be indeterminably guaranteed by the 
Arm of Service. A member who transferred to the Secretariat was to remain on the Arm 
of Service seniority list until such time as he became eligible for promotion. If the offer 
for promotion was accepted he was to'retum to the Arm of Service, and if not accepted, 
his name was removed from the seniority list and he forfeited the right to return.'27 
E. THE STRATEGY FOR STAFFING 
The strategy for staffing the Defense Secretariat represented a combination of the 
initial and supplementary Personnel workgroup reports, the verbal presentation given at 
weekly Ministry of Defense Project meetings and subsequent discussions in the 
Personnel Division. 128 
The Ministry of Defense Project team drew up a staffing strategy for the Defense 
secretariat. The majority of the policy and finance posts manned by the military at 
Defense Headquarters, were approved and moved to the Defense Secretariat in order to 
be converted to civilian posts. Additional integration posts were created to address the 
need for representivity as required by the mandate of the Defense Secretariat in the 
Department of Defense. The staffing of these posts had to be done in a legitimate, 
transparent, and accountable way.'*' 
Although each post in the Defense Secretariat was defined in terms of a post and 
man description, the critical staffing requirements identified were:13o 
12' hid, p. 12. 
12' Staffing of the Defense Secretariat, Document by the Ministry of Defense Project Team, 1995. 
Ibid, p. 1. 
I3O Ibid,pp. 1-2. 
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1. Functional Expertise. Those members possessing a wide and detailed 
knowledge of the function, were to be appointed for all levels in the Department of 
Defense. Because relatively few members would represent each function in the Defense 
Secretariat (finance excluded), this in-depth knowledge and expertise was a necessity to 
create the balance of the Ministry of Defense concept. On the other hand, the Defense 
Secretariat was to assume responsibility for policy formulation, therefore, a sound 
knowledge of how policy and procedures were handled within Department of Defense 
and the Public Service, was going to be important to get the implementation off the 
ground quickly and effectively. 
2. Knowledne of the DeDartment of Defense. A detailed knowledge of the 
Department of Defense was essential for the incumbents to have, so they could know 
how the parts fit into the whole and how the Department interacted with the rest of the 
public service and other role players. Knowledge of the cultural aspects of the 
department was essential at the implementation of the Defense Secretariat, as good 
interaction between the Defense Secretariat and the Defense Headquarters was critical for 
this concept to succeed. 
3. Representivity. It was expected that the Defense Secretariat would reflect 
the diversity of the population to a significant extent from the outset, by accommodating 
representatives that might not have had the opportunity to hlly conform to the 
requirements of a post. Care was exercised from the beginning, that this expectation did 
not hamper the effectiveness of the Defense Secretariat, as it would not easily regain its 
credibility. These members were carried against training (integration) posts in the 
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interim so that the effectiveness of the Defense secretariat was not adversely affected due 
to their unavailability while they were busy attending courses. 
4. Management Skills. A level of highly developed management skills was a 
prerequisite for the Defense Secretariat to effectively exercise the control for the purpose 
for which it was created. These skills were to be supported by applicable academic 
qualifications in the senior level appointments. The ability to handle many diverse 
matters at the corporate level and to communicate effectively, orally and in writing was 
essential. All appointees had to satisfy these requirements so that the relatively small 
, Defense Secretariat could exert the required influence and control. 
F. STRATEGIC CRITICAL ISSUES FOR STAFFING 
The Ministry of Defense Project Team cautioned that military members who 
occupied strategic posts at Defense Headquarters that were to be moved to the Defense 
Secretariat, must be handled in a “legitimate, just, and equitable way” to avoid losing 
them.131 The majority of these members represented many years of “irreplaceable 
expertise and knowledge, which was essential for occupying positions at that level of the 
organization.7y132 The Finance Division’s posts that were to move to the Defense 
Secretariat were, for instance, manned by the “core of the high level military financial 
expertise in South Afiica and the loss of this expertise could cripple the Department of 
Defense.”133 Therefore, those making staffing choices were cognizance of this fact and 
options that entailed retrenchments, with a resultant loss of expertise, were to be avoided. 




In order to develop staffing alternatives and meet the critical staffing needs, 
several options were considered for different circumstances: 34 
1. Differentiation. It was contended that some of the positions, such as 
operations required specialized military expertise or military knowledge. One possibility 
was to have these posts permanently classified as being military instead of civilian. This 
option would not enhance representivity in the short term. As this approach might have 
defeated the object of independent control, this option was to be considered only in a 
limited number of deserving cases. 
2. Phasing. In a variation of the above option, the Defense Secretariat could 
only become fully “civilianised” once civilian members had been prepared for or were 
available to accept full responsibility for a post. The conversion of the military posts to 
civilian posts was therefore to be phased, as and when the military incumbent could be 
replaced due to natural attrition, etc, or when a suitable civilian replacement became 
available. Because there was a variety of posts and incumbents in the Defense 
Secretariat, this variety created enough opportunities to comply with all the critical 
appointment requirements until such time as the civilians were able to take over the full 
scope of responsibilities. 
3. “Permanent Secondment.” To ensure the expertise and knowledge 
requirements and to ensure allegiance, military members were to be “seconded” to the 
Defense Secretariat with the understanding that this “secondment” will be “permanent” 
and that these members would not return to the military organization unless they so 
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request. This “permanent secondment” would only occur with the member’s approval as 
it could place limitation on the member’s career due to the smaller Defense Secretariat 
organization. The Defense Secretariat would then take over full responsibility for the 
“seconded” member’s career development, administration, etc. This option was to ensure 
that senior military expertise would be available for the initial start up of the Defense 
Secretariat and that members with military experience were not denied their individual 
service benefits while the Defense Secretariat concept was being developed to its full 
potential. This option would enhance representivity in the short term if members with 
enough functional expertise and the Department of Defense knowledge were available. 
4. Role Players. This is almost similar to the previous option except that the 
members could occupy critical posts in the Defense Secretariat on a rotational basis by 
being transferred for a limited period. This option had the advantage that the required 
military expertise and knowledge would be available from the inception of the Defense 
Secretariat. The member’s approval for the transfer was not a prerequisite. In the short 
term, this option would enhance representivity but with difficulty. Potential allegiance 
dilemmas existed as members might be hesitant to exercise effective control if they had 
to return to the military organization once their role playing tour is completed. The role 
playing posts would be reduced as civilians become available to accept those positions. 
5. Civilian Appointments. Obviously this was the most desirable option but 
it was doubthl as to whether it would initially be able to resolve the major critical 
expertise and knowledge staffing needs. It had the potential to enhance representivity in 
the short term, and like the “permanent secondment” option, the risks were that members 
with enough functional expertise and knowledge of the Department of Defense may not 
76 
be available. The normal public service policy procedures had to be complied with to 
ensure that the required transparency, legitimacy, and accountability principles were met. 
This was going to be a time consuming process as it required special expertise to 
administer. It was expected that many partially suitable applications with little military 
expertise would be received for all advertised posts. The civilians employed in the 
Department of Defense were also eligible for transfers. This was to the advantage of the 
Secretariat, especially the financial function, as the posts could be moved and the civilian 
incumbents transferred through a quicker process, provided the incumbent did not have to 
be promoted, which again required the lengthy advertising process. It was therefore 
prudent that this option be implemented with caution, taking into consideration the 
possible delays in placement, the practicable infrastructure available to process, the 
procedure, as well as the probable unsuitability of the majority of applicants. 
6.  Demilitarizing;. This option was to address the potential problem of 
allegiance because members would no longer be employed under the Defense Act and 
would start a new career as civilian public servants. Military expertise and knowledge 
could be assured while representivity goals would suffer. Ideally this option was to apply 
once a member has been transferred or seconded to the post so that advertising the post 
would not be a requirement. This was provided the member’s military rank was not 
lower than the civilian post rank level. The member would retain limited benefits like 
personal salary range, if applicable, previous pensionable service as well as accrued 
leave. However, a major problem was that the member would be remunerated according 
to another Personnel Administrative Standard and would lose military allowances, 
medical, and special military pension benefits. This re-employment under the Public 
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Service Act would also require additional service to a deferred retirement date. Unless 
these problems were solved and selected military members retained their benefits when 
appointed to civilian posts at the Defense Secretariat, it was doubtful whether this would 
be a viable option for senior members because the financial loss to the member would 
severely affect his well being. This option would then be better for members who had just 
started their career in the military and might wish to explore opportunities in the wider 
civil service. 
7. Retrenchment and Reamointment. Military members could be retrenched, 
receive additional benefits and be appointed on contract for a period, after the required 
approval has been obtained. This process would ensure the smooth implementation of 
the Defense Secretariat by satismng many of the critical staffing needs with the possible 
exception of representivity. This option had the ethical problem of laying off members at 
added cost, only to employ them again in the same post. The cost factor would make this 
an unacceptable option for the state. 
8. Other Methods. Other options were generated outside the standard legal 
and Personnel Service Code limitations. However, it was recommended that, due to the 
major ramifications these could have to the public service as a whole, they should only be 
contemplated once the real problems relating to specific individuals have been identified. 
The Personnel Service Code’s function was to protect the interests of all the serving civil 
servants, and any request to deviate fiom the approved process and policies would have 
little chance of success. 
Finally, the following were recommended: 
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1. A phased approach to converting the military posts to civilian posts be 
adopted, and 
2. A combination of the options: “permanent secondment”, role players, and 
civilian appointments be accepted as the major staffing options for the implementation of 
the Defense Secretariat concept, provided that a balanced attainment of the critical 
staffing needs would be realized and sufficient suitable civilian appointments are made to 
ensure transparency. 
3. Depending on the circumstances, other options could be considered, 
excluding the retrenchment and reappointment option as it would be too costly. 
4. The ‘other methods’ option should be avoided, however, if utilized caution 
should be exercised. 
G. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
The Personnel Division of the Defense Force investigated the implementation 
options for the manning of the Defense Secretariat. The manning of the relevant posts 
was dependent upon correctly compiled post and man profiles. These would be 
completed by the different hctional workgroups in cooperation with Director 
Management Services and Inspector General of the Defense Force once the preliminary 
“final” structure has been approved. More details relating to the applicable stfling 
option for each post were to be supplied as a matter of urgency in order to allow the 
assessment and the full implications and to commence with the required recruitment or 
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appointment actions. The manning of the posts would be an intricate process, as the 
incumbents not selected would also have to be processed ~orrectly.'~' 
The emphasis of this Ministry of Defense project was therefore shifted to the 
manning process including placement, recruiting, selection, appointment, etc. This 
process depended on information from others such as career development, to enable 
prospective members to be properly briefed prior to accepting an appointment. Plans 
were made to accommodate the incumbents who were not selected to man the Defense 
Secretariat posts. These plans were coordinated with the defense force integration and 
rationalization process.'36 
A suitably qualified senior appointment, was to be made to the Ministry of 
Defense Project Team or to the Defense Secretariat Personnel Staff, to take over the 
research and document the functions to prepare for approval by the Defense headquarters 
on a full-time basis. He was to work in cooperation with the Defense Force Personnel 
Division and the hctional workgroups. Temporary appointments, e.g. from the 
Reserves, would be considered until the prospective Defense Secretariat personnel 
functionaries had been identified, although it would be advantageous that continuity be 
rnaintai~~ed.'~' 
The Project Team and the Steering Committee were to guarantee transparency of 
the manning process and, unless it was absolutely unavoidable, civilian placement 
agencies would not be utilized, as additional delays were most likely to occur due to lack 
13' Minutes of the Ministry of Defense Workmow, of 17 August 1994, and Paragraph 13 of Ministrv of 
Defense WorkmouD, of 31 August 1994, and Paragraph 4.a. of HSP/DPB/B/524/1/1/6 of 25 February 1995. 
136 Ibid. 
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of civil service expertise. The Public Service Commission could not be sidelined in this 
process, as they were the only organization with a mandate to approve appointments in 
terms of the Public Service Act.'38 
The project team made the following  recommendation^:'^^ 
1. Senior personnel staff were to be appointed on a hll-time basis to the 
Ministry of Defense Project or to the Defense Secretariat as a matter of urgency to 
complete the final personnel planning and to liaise with the defense force Personnel 
Division and the functional workgroups. 
2. Posts and manning profiles were to be completed by the functional 
workgroups as a matter of urgency. 
3. Preferred staffing options were to be examined and selected, taking the 
circumstances of prospective candidates into consideration. 
4. Supernumerary members were to be identified as soon as possible and 
plans were to be made for their fhture in cooperation with the Personnel Division. 
5.  The Project Team and the Steering Committee were to ensure the 
transparency of manning of the Defense Secretariat. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
The appointment of the steering committee comprised of the Chief of the South 
Afiican National Defense Force and the Secretary of Defense which was to be 





Secretariat was another milestone in leveling the playing fields. This composition gave a 
balance of views from both the military and the civilian components of the Department of 
Defense. The function was not left solely in the hands of the military, which would have 
made the military both a referee and a player. 
Once again, the composition of the Ministry of Defense Project Team by 
representatives of both MK and SADF members leveled the playing fields. The fact that 
such a team planned the structural transformation and coordinated the implementation 
made the process credible and legitimate. All parties made their inputs as equals and no 
one was a referee and a player at the same time. 
The approval of the ‘balance model’ by the Cabinet and the consultative process 
with the Joint Portfolio Standing Committee on Defense, the Public Service Commission, 
the State Expenditure, and the Office of the Auditor General, was important for civilian 
supremacy. The military could not implement structures without approval by the elected 
officials of the public. 
The fact that during the initial period of establishing the Defense Secretariat, the 
Chief of the South African National Defense Force remained the Head of the Department 
of Defense while the Secretary was the Accounting Officer indicates the sensitive manner 
in which the transition was handled. Power was not immediately stripped fi-om the 
military as this would likely have created a climate of non-collaboration between the 
civilians and the uniformed personnel. It was important that the military become part of 
the process so that they could help in empowering the civilian personnel. 
The establishment of the Defense Secretariat in a deliberately phased transitional 
process was important so that the skills of the military personnel who had been carrying 
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out the policy and finance functions could be enhanced. Though the process might seem 
prolonged, it was crucial that the military impart some of the technical skills to the 
civilians. Hence a phased approach of converting the military posts to civilian posts was 
important. 
The variety of staffing options created an opportunity for the new Secretariat 
organization to fill the crucial posts temporarily with knowledgeable military personnel. 
The fact that some military personnel could voluntarily become civilians and serve the 
Secretariat created an important pool of potential personnel to man critical posts. 
By ensuring the transparency of the manning of the Defense Secretariat credibility 
was given to the process because it was not only the military running the show but their 
civilian counterparts were also equally involved. On the other hand, taking the need for 
representivity into account, made the process more legitimate especially since the 
majority of the formally oppressed South Afiicans did not have the necessary exposure to 
the defense function. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL ROLE 
The South Afiican transition to democracy was threatened by a potential 
destabilization fkom the security forces. Because of this threat, the political leadership 
took a leading role to ensure civilian control over the military in order to avert the 
potential danger of a coup. The leading role that the politicians played during the 
military negotiations resulted in the establishment of sound civil-military relations. 
Indeed, South Afiica offers an important model of how civilian control over the 
military can be established, particularly in those functions that relate to policy and 
finance. Although the country reflects its own unique history and political experiences, 
the way in which MK and their counterparts in SADF conducted the negotiations for the 
establishment of civilian control offers potentially valuable lessons for other nations to 
adapt and apply to their own challenges. 
B. VALUABLE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
The leading role played by the political leaders in overseeing the military 
negotiations ip South Afiica was fundamental to the success of the process. It took a 
strong political will fiom the ANC to insist on the creation of the Transitional Executive 
Council so that the political playing fields could be leveled. n e  Transitional Executive 
Council with its multiparty cabinet committee, and its institutional capacity to exercise 
multiparty control over the broadcasting, finance, and the security forces was a milestone 
in the leveling process. The apartheid regime was denied the opportunity to monopolize 
the media and the purse, which it could have used effectively against the opposition 
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during the transition period. By keeping the security forces under check during the 
transition allowed an atmosphere where the negotiations would proceed in good spirit. 
Therefore, a party negotiating with a powerful military like the SADF must have a 
well thought out strategy. An atmosphere conducive for negotiation must be created 
where all parties have an equal voice. To realize this objective, legal mechanisms like 
the adoption of the Interim Constitution in South Africa can be instituted. Transitional 
political institutions like the Transitional Executive Council help in leveling the political 
playing fields. These institutions are the ones empowered to oversee the negotiations and 
the whole transitional process. This guarantees some limitations on certain parties from 
abusing state power, by virtue of being the govemment of the day, in order to overwhelm 
their counterparts in negotiation. 
On the other hand, the direct interest and role that politicians played during the 
process of negotiations, in a principal-agent relationship, took power fiom the military in 
policy decisions. This laid concrete foundations for civil-military relations. Military 
negotiations are very delicate and they should not be relegated to the realm of military 
negotiators only. There should be a political commitment and guidance to the process. 
The military officers negotiating should be agents for their political principals. Where 
the military fail to reach a consensus, the politicians should intervene. From the 
beginning of the negotiation, the chain of command must be clear, the politicians should 
be the bosses. 
The adoption of the Interim Constitution was important in leveling the political 
playing fields, because it meant that the transition period was governed by the new laws, 
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where all parties were equals during the negotiations. Ultimately the demand by the 
ANC that the regime could not be a referee and a player at the same time was realized. 
Another important factor in the negotiations of this a nature is that parties must try 
and have an understanding of the history of civil-military relations of the parties involved 
because this will empower them to have an understanding of the arguments made. 
Failure to understand the mental frame of the opposite side might lead to suspicions that 
are uncalled for, and this might lead to tensions that sabotage the whole process. It was 
because of understanding this history that the SADF never saw the insistence by MK on 
civilian control as a deceptive ploy with sinister intentions. They could make peace with 
the fact that in MK civilian supremacy was the order of the day. On the one hand, their 
own history showed that the concept was not new, and above all it was practiced in all 
established democracies. 
The invitation of academics and policymaking institutions that comprised the 
Ministry of Defense workgroup was a good mechanism for avoiding tensions that could 
have developed among military negotiators. This workgroup avoided what could have 
resulted in the ‘us’ and ‘them’ syndrome; meaning ‘us’ MK and ‘them’ SADF or vice 
versa because they were seen as non-partisan. Such a syndrome could have created bad 
faith among negotiators and ultimately delaying the speedy resolution of the 
establishment of civilian control over the military. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense 
workgroup was a good mechanism in the leveling process. The creation of a neutral 
workgroup to deal with issues of the military in a democracy lend legitimacy and 
credibility to the process of negotiations. The workgroup enjoyed this legitimacy 
because most of its participants were seen as ‘outsiders’ who did not have any self- 
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interest in the outcome and hence none was a referee and a player at the same time. It 
was more credible because it was a professional group comprising of specialists in 
defense related studies and could therefore make informed decisions on how to conduct 
the military function in a democracy. This made the military negotiators focus on issues 
like threat analysis, force structure, force design etc. 
The adoption of a ‘balance model’ in the new Ministry of Defense removed 
uncertainties as who will be responsible for policy and finance matters. However, the 
recommended collaboration relationship between civilians and the military components 
was another milestone because while it accepted the exclusivity of certain functions, it 
recognized that some functions under the civilian component require military 
collaboration and vice versa. In this way a harmonious climate was created for civil- 
military relations to flourish. 
The appointment of both the Chief of the South Afiican National Defense Force 
and the Secretary of Defense to the steering committee which was responsible for the 
execution of approved plans for the establishment of the Defense Secretariat was very 
important. It gave a balance of views fiom the civilian and military components of the 
Department of Defense. Once again the playing fields were leveled and no one was both 
a referee and a player. The same objective was achieved when the Ministry of Defense 
Project Team was constituted to plan the structural transformation and coordination of the 
implementation process. It comprised officers fiom both MK and SADF and therefore 
making the process more credible and legitimate. 
During the initial process of the establishment of the Defense Secretariat, the 
Chief of the South Afiican National Defense Force remained the Head of the Department 
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while the Secretary was the Accounting Officer. This indicated the sensitive manner in 
which the process of transition was handled. The Chief of the South African National 
Defense Force was not suddenly stripped of all the power as this might have alienated the 
military and created an atmosphere of non-collaboration between the civilians and the 
uniformed personnel. It was very crucial to have the military as part of the transition 
process so that they could empower the new civilian personnel with the required skills in 
performing their functions. However, it is important to be cautious of dividing the role of 
the Head of the Department and the Accounting function. In practical terms this might 
weaken the civilian Secretary if he has to be the Accounting Officer while the military 
chief is the head. Hence this situation was attended to immediately to address the 
anomaly. 
The establishment of the Defense Secretariat in a deliberately phased transitional 
manner was important in that the military personnel who had been responsible for both 
the finance and policy functions could continue serving in those capacities until their 
skills have been imparted to their civilian counterparts. Although such a process seemed 
prolonging the establishment of civilian control, it was crucial that the military impart 
these technical skills to the civilians. A phased approach of converting the military posts 
to civilian posts was important. 
Another important breakthrough was a variety of the staffing options devised for 
the new Secretariat organization. Crucial posts of the Secretariat were temporarily 
manned with knowledgeable military personnel. Some of the military had the option of 
voluntarily become civilians and serve the Defense Secretariat thus creating a pool of 
potential personnel to man critical posts. 
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By ensuring that the manning process of the Secretariat organization is 
transparent, the process became more credible. Both the military and civilians were 
equally involved in the transition process. By taking representivity into account the 
process was further legitimized. It broadened the horizons of opportunities for the 
majority of the formerly oppressed South Africans who did not have exposure to the 
defense functions. 
‘Lastly, the institution of time lines for military negotiators, by the political 
leadership, creates a business or mission like approach. The negotiators are able to avoid 
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